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Plate 1. Chinese inhabitants in Java in the early nineteenth century with their 
pigtails and special style of dress. Sketch by the Belgian artist, A . A . J . Payen 
(1792-1853). Photograph from the A . A . J . Payen Collection (Sketchbook E) by 
courtesy of the Rijksmuseum voor Volkenkunde, Leiden.
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IN CEN TR AL JA V A , 1755-1825*
Peter Carey
7. Introduction
On September 23, 1825, during the opening months of the Java War (1825-30), 
a small cavalry squadron commanded by Radfen Ayu Yudakusuma, a daughter of the 
first Sultan of Yogyakarta, swooped down on the vital trading post of Ngawi on the 
Sala river. It was home to a sizeable Chinese population, consisting mainly of rice 
brokers, petty traders, and coolies, which had been temporarily swollen by the in­
flux of refugees from the surrounding countryside.* 1 They had barricaded them­
selves into the houses of the prominent, Chinese merchants with their heavy teak 
shutters and doors. Unfortunately, these precautions, effective in normal times 
against the depredations of roving groups of kdcu (robbers, brigands) infesting 
the eastern outlying provinces of the Central Javanese courts, proved of little avail 
against the heavy axes and razor-sharp pikes of Rad£n Ayu Yudakusuma's war 
band. Indifferent to the pitiful cries of the women and children, Ngawi's entire 
Chinese community was put to the sword, the mutilated bodies being left to lie 
where they fell, in blood-smeared doorways, streets, and houses.2 Shocking in its 
ruthlessness, the massacre of Ngawi was by no means unique in these terrible, ear­
ly months of the Java War. Throughout Central Java and along the entire length of 
the Sala river, these scenes were repeated as isolated Chinese communities were at­
tacked and the petrified survivors fled for their lives to the comparative safety of
* The author would like to thank the following for their help in the preparation of 
this article: D r. Leonard Bluss& (University of Leiden), D r. The Siauw Giap (U ni­
versity of Leiden), and Professor M. C . Ricklefs (Monash U niversity).
1. On the Chinese population of Ngawi in 1808 which numbered twenty adult males 
over the age of fourteen (one tollgate keeper, four traders, and fifteen coolies), 
see "Bundel Djokjo Brieven" (volume of letters in the Yogyakarta Residency archive 
of the Arsip Nasional, Jakarta) [henceforth Dj. B r .]  86, Tan Jin Sing, "Generaale 
Lyst van zoodanige Chineesen als volgens opgave van den Capitein dien Natie alhier. 
Tan Djin Sing, zich alhier te Djocjocarta en verdere daaronder gehoorende plaatsen 
bevinden met aantooning van hunne woonplaats en kostwinning," May 1808. Togeth­
er with their families, they probably numbered around sixty to eighty souls, and 
the size of the population in 1825 was almost certainly very much larger.
2. On the massacre of Ngawi, see De Java-Oorlog van 1825-30, 6 vols. (vols. 1-3 
by P. J . F . Louw, vols. 4-6 by E. S. de Klerck) (Batavia/The Hague: Lands- 
drukkerij/Nijhoff, 1894-1909), 1: 522-25, 545, 561, 584. It is interesting to note 
that the Javanese female commander, R. A . Yudakusuma, who was married to the 
sickly Yogyakarta Bupati of Wirasari (post-July 1812, Muneng), had earlier con­
tracted debts to Chinese moneylenders in East Java, see Peter Carey, e d .. The 
British in Java, 1811-16: A Javanese Account (Singapore: Brash, forthcoming), 
n. 271 of the babad.
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2the Dutch garrison towns and the Chinese settlements on Java's north coast. Even 
well-established Chinese colonies, such as the 800-strong weaving population of 
Jana in eastern Bagel&n, eventually had to be evacuated, and scores of tollgate 
keepers (bandar) were murdered.3
As the war progressed, the picture became more varied. There were, for exam­
ple, a few mixed-blood (peranakan) Chinese in Central Java who made common cause 
with Dipanagara's forces, supplying them with silver money, arms, gunpowder, and 
opium, and even, on occasion, fighting alongside them. 4 This was the case around 
Lasem on the north coast during Rad§n Tumenggung Sasradilaga's abortive campaign 
there in 1827-28. Local Chinese, many of whom were already converts to Islam and 
were descended from mixed-blood Chinese families long resident in the island, col­
laborated closely with the Javanese and were subjected to bitter Dutch reprisals 
after Sasradilaga's defeat. 5 On the whole, however, such instances of Sino-Java­
nese cooperation were rare. The bloody events of the first months of the war had 
traumatized the Chinese, and a deep suspicion of Javanese intentions remained as 
an abiding legacy of this period. These attitudes of fear and mistrust were recipro­
cated by the Javanese. Dipanagara himself led the way by forbidding his command­
ers to enter into intimate relations with the Chinese. In particular, he warned them 
against taking Chinese peranakan mistresses from the civilian population,for he re­
garded such alliances as incurring inevitable misfortune (s/b/). This attitude 
stemmed from an episode just before the prince's disastrous defeat at Cowok, 
outside Surakarta, on October 15, 1826, when, according to his autobiographical 
babad (chronicle), he had succumbed to the charms of a captured Chinese girl from 
the Pajang area whom he employed as a masseuse. 6 He also later ascribed his broth­
er-in-law  Sasradilaga's defeat on the north coast to his blatant breach of his instruc­
tions when Sasradilaga had sexual congress with one of the Chinese ladies of Lasem. 7
3. On the Chinese colony in Jana, which was eventually evacuated by the Dutch in 
May 1827, see Bataviasche Courant no. 41 (October 12, 1825), pp. 1-2; Louw, De 
Java-Oorlog , 2: 215-16, 333-34; and ib id ., 3: 86, 108-9. For the location of Jana, 
see Appendix 2.
4. P. B. R. Carey, ed. and trans., Babad Dipanagara. An Account of the Out­
break of the Java War (1825-30) (Kuala Lumpur: A rt Printers, 1981), p. 260,n. 106.
5. Louw, De Java-Oorlog , 3: 525; and Pangeran Arya Dipanagara, Serat Babad 
Dipanagaran karanganipun Swargi Kangjeng Pangeran Arya  Dipanagara piyambak 
nyariosaken wiwit keremipun dhateng Agami Islam tuwin dadosing prang ageng 
ngantos dumiginipun kakendhangaken dhateng Menadho, 2 vols. (Surakarta: Rusche, 
1908-9), 2: 26.
6. Louw, De Java-Oorlog , 2: 517, n. 1; Carey, Babad Dipanagara, p. 260,n. 106; 
and Dipanagara, Serat Babad Dipanagaran, 1: 258-59:
X X V III (Sinom) 14. ana ing Daren punika
ing dalu kinen meteki 
kang boyongan Nyonyah Cina 
Kangjeng Sultan salah kardi 
saking tyas mring rayi 
kinarya panglipur wuyung
7. Louw, De Java-Oorlog , 3: 525; and Dipanagara, Serat Babad Dipanagaran, 2: 26: 
XXXIII (Maskumambang) 71..............
Cina ing Lasem sedaya
3Indeed, right up to the end of the Java War, Dipanagara set his face against too 
close contacts with the members of the local Chinese communities, whom he regarded 
as among the principal sources of Javanese economic oppression.
In the light of our knowledge of modern Indonesian history since the Java War, 
such attitudes appear readily understandable. After all, the Chinese played an un­
enviable role as overseers, opium retailers, and moneylenders during the period of 
the cultivation systems (1830-70), and later emerged as major economic competitors 
of the Javanese during the early years of the twentieth century. Indonesia's first, 
mass political movement, the Sarekat Dagang Islam (Islamic Traders' Association), 
was founded in Surakarta in 1911 in part as an anti-Chinese commercial cooperative 
of local bathik manufacturers. Subsequently, the equivocal attitude of many Indo­
nesian Chinese communities during the struggle for independence against the Dutch 
(1945-49), and their dominance of local commerce and capital markets up to 1959, 
made them the frequent objects of discrimination and attack. Even today, marriages 
between Javanese and Chinese, especially in the higher echelons of Javanese society, 
are attended with difficulties. Usually members of the Javanese priyayi (official) 
elite warn against them, saying that the Chinese "ashes" are older, meaning that 
the offspring of such unions are likely to prove more Chinese than Javanese.8 A 
recent tragic event in the Mangkunegaran family seemed to confirm this warning, 
the death of the Heir Apparent, Gusti Kangjeng Pangeran Harya Radityo Prabuku- 
suma, being blamed by contemporaries on just such a mesalliance with a local perana- 
kan Chinese g i r l .9
In the view of the present author, however, such attitudes towards the Chinese 
communities in Central Java have only crystallized over the past 150 years, precisely 
the time of the greatest foreign economic impact on the interior of the island. Before 
that period ( i .e . ,  prior to the ill-fated Java War of 1825-30), in court circles at 
least, a very different relationship seems to have prevailed between the two commun­
ities. This was one based not on mutual suspicion, but on a marked degree of reci­
procity, common interest,and intercommunal cooperation. The Chinese were needed 
at the courts as money-lenders and commercial experts. They could supply financial 
skills which were simply not available in Javanese society. There are even indica­
tions that a certain amount of intermarriage took place between the Javanese priyayi 
and the Chinese. Occasionally, local rulers also took attractive Chinese peranakan 
women as secondary wives (garwa ampeyan), and any idea that such matrimonial 
alliances inevitably brought misfortune in their wake appears to have been foreign 
to the Javanese. The Chinese, for their part, found that their links with the courts
72. mapan sampun sumeja manjing A garni 
Den Sasradilaga
dadya supe weling A ji 
an jamah i N yon yah Cina
73. pan punika ingkang dadi marganeki 
apes juritira
8. Benedict R. O 'G . Anderson, Mythology and the Tolerance of the Javanese 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, 1965), p. 1.
9. K. G. P. A . Radityo Prabukusuma (the eldest son of Gusti Kangjeng Pangeran 
Harya Adipati Mangkunegara VIII [ r .  1944 to present] and his late, principal con­
sort, Gusti Putri Wasunituti [d . 1978]) was killed at the wheel of his Honda Civic 
car just outside Bayalali when he was in collision with a jeep in December 1977. His 
peranakan Chinese wife (now pursuing an acting career in Surakarta) and small 
child were at his side but were unscathed. Interviews with members of the Mangku­
negaran family, Istana Mangkunegaran, Surakarta, April 1978.
were often a sine qua non for their commercial success in the hinterland, and they 
actively sought to strengthen these ties through marriage and personal relation­
ships. In this fashion, at the higher levels of society, well-acculturated Chinese 
mixed-blood communities appear to have grown up which had adopted, without os­
tensible difficulty, the mannerisms and language of their Javanese neighbors.
Whether this situation was also mirrored in the relations between the Chinese 
and the Javanese at the village level is far less clear. It could well be that in cer­
tain areas there was a degree of mutual suspicion and friction between the two com­
munities from the first. Scattered references in the Dutch East India Company 
(VO C) archives from the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries discussed 
below seem to point in that direction. But until a determined effort is made to comb 
the rich sources of the Company period for data on this topic, it will not be possible 
to draw any firm conclusions.
The present essay thus has a distinctly modest scope. It will look in detail at 
the gradual erosion of Sino-Javanese relations only as it occurred in the territories 
controlled by the Central Javanese kingdoms between the Peace of Ciyanti (1755) 
and the outbreak of the Java War (1825), and it should always be remembered that 
this is merely a fragment of a much wider picture. The process of social and eco­
nomic change took place under different conditions and at different speeds through­
out the island. Some areas, like Banten and the Priangan highlands in West Java, 
where Chinese immigration was prohibited until the early years of this century, did 
not experience the same tensions at this time. Other regions, like the Batavian En­
virons (Bataviaase Ommelanden) and Cirebon, where extensive land leases had al­
ready occurred in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, witnessed periods 
of bitter, intercommunal strife much earlier.10 But, although these areas will be 
referred to for comparative purposes where appropriate, the main focus will remain 
the princely states of south-central Java in the 1755-1825 period.
2. The Historical Background, c. 1400-1800
Trading connections between China and Java are of long standing and probably 
date back to the early centuries of the Christian e ra .11 By the time of the heyday 
of the east Javanese Majapahit "empire" in the fourteenth century, the local Java­
nese elites appear to have become accustomed to imported Chinese luxuries such as 
silk, porcelain, and lacquer ware. Along the length of Java's north coast, commun­
10. On the Bataviaase Ommelanden, see Leonard Blusse, "Batavia, 1619-1740: The 
Rise and Fall of a Chinese Colonial Tow n," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 12, 
no. 1 (March 1981) : 169-78; and on Cirebon, see J . A . van den Broek, "De Cheri- 
bonsche Opstand van 1806," Tijdspiegel 3 (1891): 368-83; and T h . Stevens, "Cire­
bon at the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century: An Analysis of the Reactions from 
a Javanese Sultanate to the Economic and Political Penetration of the Colonial Regime 
between 1797 and 1816," in Papers of the Dutch-lndonesian Historical Conference 
Held at Noordwijkerhout, the Netherlands, 19 to 22 May 1976, ed. Anthony Day and 
A . B. Lapian (Leiden: Bureau of Indonesian Studies, 1978), pp. 79-86.
11. For a good discussion of the early Chinese contacts with Southeast Asia, see 
Paul Wheatley, The Golden Khersonese. Studies in the Historical Geography of the 
Malay Peninsula before A .D . 1500 (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1966), 
pp. 1-122. Additional information on Chinese relations with Java, and patterns of 
Chinese settlement during the Majapahit period (1294-1527) can be found in N. J . 
Krom, Hindoe-Javaansche Geschiedenis (Th e  Hague: Nijhoff, 1931), p. 478 index 
sub: "China, Chineezen."
5ities of Chinese merchants had established themselves during the same period, and 
some intermarriage seems to have taken place with the local Indonesian population. 
Over the course of time most of the mixed-blood Chinese who resulted from these 
unions were converted to Islam. The researches of D r. Pigeaud and D r. de Graaf 
into the notoriously fragmented history of the early Islamic states in Java have 
drawn attention to the role played by members of these north coast Chinese commun­
ities in the spread of Islam in Java and the development of the burgeoning port cities 
on the north coast in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.12 Even at the height 
of the Hindu-Buddhist "empire," some of the petty officials (tollgate keepers), boat­
men, and traders along the Brantas river appear to have been of Chinese extraction, 
and Pigeaud makes particular mention of one of these mixed-blood officials, the A d i- 
pati of T&rung, who installed the first imam (leader of the faithful) of the old mosque 
at Ngamp&l Denta in Surabaya in the fifteenth century. Indeed, according to local 
traditions, two of the most important of the legendary wall sanga (nine "apostles of 
Islam") in Java, Sunan Bunang and Sunan Ngampel Denta, were of Chinese ancestry.13 14
Throughout the following centuries, these Chinese communities continued to 
play a vital part in the economic and social life of the inland Javanese states. Trade 
through north coast ports constituted a crucial source of revenue for the seven­
teenth century Javanese kingdom of Mataram, and the Chinese appear to have domi­
nated the key export trades in rice and teak timber. Tumenggung Wiraguna, the 
official who emerged as the most influential figure at court during the last years of 
Sultan Agung's reign (1613—46), apparently owed much of his power to his extensive 
trading activities and his use of Chinese middlemen and rice brokers who arranged 
the sale of his exports in Batavia.llf The Mataram rulers were also dependent on 
the Chinese. In 1653, the incompetent Amangkurat I ( r .  1646-77) found that his 
projected blockade of Bali was aborted from the very beginning by the refusal of 
the Chinese to halt their rice trade with the island.15 His subsequent attempts to 
close the north coast ports (1655-57; 1660-61) and forbid all coastal shipping were 
more admissions of defeat than the acts of a powerful sovereign.16 In fact, both 
the Dutch East India Company and the Javanese rulers needed the Chinese for their 
commercial operations,17 and this need was reflected in the privileged administrative
12. H. J . de Graaf and T h . G. T h . Pigeaud, "De Eerste Moslimse Vorstendommen 
op Java. Studien over de Staatkundige Geschiedenis van de 15de en 16de Eeuw,"
Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 
(Leiden) [henceforth VKI] 69 (1974), passim.
13. De Graaf and Pigeaud, "Eerste Moslimse Vorstendommen," p. 159; and p. c.
D r. Pigeaud, November 27, 1979 (" .  . . Sunan Ngampbl en Sunan Bonang hadden, 
volgens de overlevering, wat (Z u id -) Chinees bloed (Campa). . . . " ) .
14. H. J .  de Graaf, "De Regering van Sultan Agung, Vorst van Mataram, 1613- 
1645, en die van zijn Voorganger Panembahan SSda-ing-Krapyak, 1601-1613," VKI 
23 (1958): 287.
15. H. J .  de Graaf, "De Regering van Sunan Mangku-Rat I Tegal-Wangi, Vorst van 
Mataram, 1646-1677. I. De Ontbinding van Het R ijk," VKI 33 (1961): 51.
16. De Graaf, "De Regering van Sunan Mangku-Rat I ,"  pp. 102-7, 134-50.
17. For an excellent discussion of the way in which the Dutch East India Company 
used Chinese traders as middlemen to corner the pepper trade of Banten and draw 
commerce to Batavia by making local producers dependent on Chinese manufactured 
supplies of lead picis (cash), see Leonard Bluss€, "Trojan Horse of Lead: The Picis 
in Early 17th Century Java," in Between People and Statistics. Essays on Modern 
Indonesian History Presented to P. Creutzberg , ed. Francien van Anrooij, et al. 
(Th e  Hague: Nijhoff, 1979), pp. 33-48.
6and legal status accorded them. Thus, in each major port city and riverine entre­
pot, a special syahbandar (toll and customs overseer) was appointed for the Chinese 
merchant community alongside the syahbandar in charge of indigenous trad ers.18 
At the same time, the exceptional commercial importance of the Chinese to the Mata- 
ram rulers was reflected in the traditional Javanese law codes which stipulated that 
the fine ( diyat; lit. : "blood money") for killing a Chinese was to be twice that for 
murdering a Javanese.19
The Dutch, for their part, also made moves to extend the legal protection of the 
Company to Chinese living in Mataram territory: under the terms of the second con 
tract signed by Amangkurat II ( r .  1677-1703) with the VOC on October 19-20, 1677, 
all such people, along with other " vremdelingen" [s/c] (foreigners), i .e .,  Maka- 
sarese, Malays, Balinese, and non-Indonesian Muslims ("M oors"), were henceforth 
placed under Company jurisdiction. 20 This legal protection was confirmed in all sub­
sequent treaties and contracts between the Batavian government and the Javanese 
rulers, and by the early nineteenth century it had been extended to include all per­
sons "of whatever description," except for those Javanese actually born within the 
territories of the Mataram successor states. 21 This important extension of govern­
ment jurisdiction was to lead to considerable friction with the Javanese rulers, espe­
cially after 1817 when all tollgate disputes involving Chinese were referred to the 
High Court ( Raad van Justitie) in Semarang.22 Eventually, in 1855, with the regu­
lations extending European legislation to "foreign orientals" ( Bepalingen houdende 
Toepaselyk verklaring van de Europese Wetgeving op de met de Indonesische Gelijk- 
gestelde Bevolking [Vreemde Oosterlingen]), the Chinese were formally accorded 
the privileges of being tried under Dutch Roman Law in all matters exclusive of fam­
ily disputes, contested wills, and quarrels over inheritance. 23
In the late seventeenth century, at the time of the 1677 contracts between 
Amangkurat II and the VOC, these developments were still in the future. But al­
ready the Chinese communities in Central Java were changing. This change was
18. De Craaf, "De Regering van Sunan Mangku-Rat I ,"  p. 20.
19. Soeripto, Ontwikkelingsgang der Vorstenlandsche Wetboeken (Leiden: IJdo, 
1929), pp. 88, 268, where passages from a prototype of the Angger Ag&ng (Great 
Law Code) of November 12, 1798 are discussed.
20. F. W. Stapel, e d ., "Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlando-Indicum. Verzameling van 
Politieke Contracten en verdere Verdragen door de Nederlanders in het Oosten ge- 
sloten, van Privilegebrieven, aan hen verleend, enz. Derde Deel (1676-1691)," B ij- 
dragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (Leiden) [henceforth B K I] 91 (1934) : 77.
21. M. L. van Deventer, ed ., Het Nederlandsch Gezag over Java en Onderhoorighe- 
den sedert 1811. Vol. i: 1811-1820 (Th e  Hague: Nijhoff, 1891), p. 316 (art. 13 of 
the treaty between the British government and Sunan Pakubuwana IV , December 23, 
1811); p. 323 (art. 8 of the treaty between the British government and Sultan 
Hamengkubuwana III, August 1, 1812); p. 329 (a rt. 8 of the treaty between the 
British government and Sunan Pakubuwana IV, August 1, 1812).
22. P. B . R. Carey, "The Origins of the Java War (1825-30)," The English Histori­
cal Review 91, no. 358 (January 1976): 67; and Victor Purcell, The Chinese in 
Southeast Asia (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 435.
23. Amen Budiman, Masyarakat Islam Tionghoa di Indonesia (Semarang: Tanjung 
Sari, 1979), p. 49, quoting E. Utrecht, Pengantar dalam Hukum Indonesia (Jakarta: 
Balai Buku Indonesia, 1953), p. 220; and R. Supomo, Sistim Hukum Di Indonesia 
Sebelum Perang Dunia K e -ll  (Jakarta: Pradjnaparamita, 1965), p. 87.
7caused by the influx of waves of new immigrants from mainland China. The fall of 
the Ming dynasty (1368— 1644), and the reopening of Chinese trade with Southeast 
Asia in 1683 in the aftermath of the successful Ch'ing army campaigns in Formosa, 
had created ideal conditions for an increased flow of immigrants from the southern 
maritime provinces, especially Hokkiens from the neighborhood of Amoy in Fukien 
province and Kwong Fus (Cantonese) from Canton and Macau. 24 The number of 
junks from China which anchored each year at the Batavian roads increased from 
three or four to more than twenty, and scores of immigrants were landed illegally on 
the Thousand Islands (Pulau Seribu) in the Bay of Batavia or on deserted stretches 
of the coast near the colonial capital.25 Many of these newcomers, both legal and 
illegal, later found their way to Semarang and other north coast ports. Ong Tae- 
hae, a Chinese mandarin of lower rank from Fukien, who spent the best part of ten 
years in the Indonesian archipelago (1783-91), much of it working as a schoolmaster 
in Pekalongan, mentioned that during the time of an enlightened Kapitan Cina of 
late eighteenth century Semarang, there was a large building in Batavia known as 
the "Semarang factory," where, on the arrival of Chinese junks, those newcomers 
who wished to proceed to Central Java took up their residence until they found ves­
sels to transport them to Semarang. These, in his words, "whether of the same or 
different clans, whether well or ill-recommended, were all received and recorded; 
after which every man was employed according to his ability and placed in the situa­
tion best adapted for h im ."26 Although written over a century after the late seven­
teenth century influx of Chinese immigrants, Ong Tae-hae's account is one of the 
few sources available that gives any hint of the sophisticated Chinese social and eco­
nomic organization in Java at this time, which clearly included traditional Chinese 
economic institutions like the hang or craftsmen guilds. 27
The same source also gives a fascinating insight into the facility with which 
some of the mixed-blood descendants of these late seventeenth century Chinese im­
migrants were able to merge into Javanese society:
When the Chinese remain abroad for several generations without returning to 
their native land, they frequently cut themselves off from the instruction of 
the sages; in language, food and dress, they imitate the natives, and, study­
ing foreign books [? the Q ur'a n], they do not scruple to become Javanese, 
when they called themselves Islam {Sit-lam ). They then refuse to eat pork 
and adopt altogether native customs. Having multiplied, in the course of 
time, the Dutch have given them into the hands of a Captain [ i .e . ,  Kapitan 
Peranakan] who superintends this class. 28
24. Blusse, "Batavia, 1619-1740," p. 170; Purcell, Chinese in Southeast Asia , pp. 
411 ff. ;  and H. J . de Craaf, De Moord op Kapitein Franqois Tack, 8 Febr. 1686 
(Amsterdam: Paris, 1935), pp. 155-58.
25. Bluss6, "Batavia, 1619-1740," p. 174, who points out that the Chinese sugar- 
mill operators (pothias) in the Ommelanden actually preferred to employ illegal immi­
grants, since they were not liable to the poll-tax and were entirely at the mercy of 
their employers (who, at the least sign of insubordination, could always threaten to 
denounce them to the Dutch sheriffs [landdrosts] ) .
26. Ong Tae-hae, The Chinaman Abroad: or a Desultory Account of the Malayan 
Archipelago, particularly of Java, ed. and trans. W. H. Medhurst (Shanghae: Mis­
sion Press, 1849), p. 24. Ong Tae-hae's account was originally published in Chi­
nese in Fukien province in 1791.
27. Blusse, "Batavia, 1619-1740," p. 161.
28. Ong Tae-hae, Chinaman Abroad, p. 33.
8As a self-conscious Chinese mandarin, Ong Tae-hae clearly did not approve of this 
process, and frequently dismissed the Javanese as a "blunt and stupid" people, 
whose chiefs could not understand "the principles of reason" and whose writing re­
sembled "crawling worms"! 29 But the really striking thing is that, despite the at­
tempts by the Dutch East India Company to keep the various nationalities in Java 
separate from one another (in the case of the Chinese to limit the spread of Islam 
and avoid the loss of the head t a x ) ,30 extensive interethnic marriage appears to 
have taken place during this period, and identification with Javanese-1 slamic culture 
had become something of a norm amongst Chinese peranakan resident on the island. 
The appointment of special Kapitan Peranakan by the Dutch to look after the inter­
ests of the group was also tantamount to official recognition of this process. Indeed, 
de Haan's work on eighteenth and early nineteenth century Batavia has drawn atten­
tion to the hybrid world of the Muslim peranakan Chinese in the city, many of whom 
had embraced Islam after the trauma of the Chinese massacre in 1740.31 Significant­
ly, the last Kapitan Peranakan of Batavia, Muhammad Japar, died in 1827 and was 
not replaced. By then, the Java War was in full swing, and it had become increas­
ingly less attractive for those of Chinese descent to identify themselves with indige­
nous c u ltu re .32 Instead, the interests of security and the lure of European legal 
privileges dictated a very different choice, namely assimilation back into the ranks 
of the mainstream Chinese community.
Turning back to the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, it is pos­
sible to trace the process of acculturation and economic penetration of local markets 
by the newly arrived Chinese immigrants. The very knowledgeable Governor-General 
elect, Johan van Hoorn (1653-1711; in office, 1704-9), who, as a boy, had visited 
the imperial court at Peking, 33 34*remarked, in his description of Java's Northeast 
Coast (c . 1700-1703), that the numbers of Chinese in this area had greatly increased 
( zeer sterk angegroeijt) in recent years ( i .e. ,  since 1683), and that, once they had 
been permitted to take up residence in the Mataram dominions, they proved them­
selves to be a hard-working and commercially astute people (een laborieus volk en 
wakre troffyquanten). Even the good-natured Javanese, in his view, had become 
more crafty and diligent through their frequent contact with the newcomers.39 
Along the whole north coast, van Hoorn wrote, "there is not a river, harbor, bay, 
or creek navigable for shipping, which does not have a customs post (tollgate), of 
which the keeper is invariably a Chinese." The Sunan ( i .e . ,  Amangkurat II, r . 
1677-1703) enjoyed an income of some 50,000 ronde realen from these tolls, one-sixth 
of which came from the principal trading centers (handelsplaatsen) on the north
29. Ib id ., pp. 15, 17, 28, 32.
30. The Siauw Giap, "Religion and Overseas Chinese Assimilation in Southeast 
Asian Countries," Revue du sud-est asiatique, 1965, no. 2: 72.
31. F. de Haan, Oud Batavia. Cedenkboek uitgegeven door het Bataviaasch Genoot- 
schap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen naar aanleiding van het 300-jarig bestaan der 
stad in 1919, 2nd ed. rev. (Bandung: Nix, 1935), pp. 394-96.
32. Ib id ., p. 396.
33. F. W. Stapel, De Gouverneurs-Generaal van Nederlandsch-lndie in Beeld en 
Woord (Th e  Hague: Van Stockum, 1941), p. 39.
34. Koninklijk Instituut voor Ta a l-, Land- en Volkenkunde Western language MS.
[henceforth K ITL V  H (H = Hollands)] 73, Johan van Hoorn, "Corte beschrijvinge
van het Noord-Oostelijckste gedeelte van Java's opkomst en voortgangh. Notitien
rakende Java's Oostcust enz." (Batavia, c. 1700-1703), pp. 15, 43. I am grateful
to D r. Leonard Blusse for lending me his notes on this invaluable source.
9coast, the rest from the tailgates and markets in the interior of Mataram, which also 
seem to have been in the hands of the Chinese.35 There are even indications that 
whole provinces of the Mataram empire were farmed to the Chinese during this 
period. This was the case, for example, with the fertile, rice-producing areas of 
Pekalongan and Batang on the north coast, together amounting to some 20 percent 
of the entire population of the pasfsir in 1704, which were leased by the Sunan to 
a Chinese family who ruled under the Javanese names of Jayaningrat and Puspana- 
gara, and whose aggressively commercial mode of administration led to a significant 
demographic decline in those territories between 1709 and 1743. 36
So great were the demands for tax-farm leases and the pressures of commercial 
competition, that the Chinese were apparently outbidding each other at the Karta- 
sura court and sometimes paying two or three times as much as the actual lease was 
worth in order to steal a march over their riva ls .37 This in turn led to a more ruth­
less exploitation of economic resources in some regions. The royal tax-farm letters 
{piagem-Dalem), meanwhile, reflected the privileged position of the Chinese as legal 
proteges of the Dutch East India Company (post-1677) for, according to van Hoorn, 
they could only be dismissed from their posts with Company approval.38
Besides the lucrative tax-farms, it is clear that the Chinese were also active in 
other spheres, namely as retailers in the increasingly profitable opium and textile 
trades (both VOC monopolies after 1677), as middlemen handling the local commerce 
in raw cotton, salt, indigo, tobacco, ginger, silks, porcelain, and pandanus-reed 
mats, and as ship builders, market gardeners, and armaments manufacturers.39
35. Ib id ., pp. 31-32, 38 (on inland tailgates). Further references to the Chinese 
as tailgate keepers and tax-farmers in the interior of Java in the early eighteenth 
century can be found in Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague [henceforth A R A ], Kolo- 
niaal Archief 2031 (Overgekomende Brieven uit Batavia, 1730), Coster (Kartasura) 
to Tersmitten (Semarang), January 13, 1730, which refers to Javanese chiefs (hoof- 
den) who leased out their "tolhecken ofte bassaars" (tailgates or markets) to the 
Chinese. The Patih of Kartasura, Raden Adipati Danureja, was also reported to 
have taken steps against these Javanese chiefs, see ib id ., Danureja (Kartasura) to 
Tersmitten (Semarang), Javanese letter received on January 2, 1730, relating that 
Sunan Pakubuwana II ( r .  1726-49) had ordered all Chinese to leave Kedhu and 
Bagelen except those who had a market or tailgate in tax-farm ("ee/i basaar of 
poorte in p a g t") . These were to be allowed to stay until their leases were completed. 
I am grateful to Professor M. C . Ricklefs for these references.
36. M. C . Ricklefs, "Some Statistical Evidence on Javanese Social, Economic and 
Demographic History in the Later Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries" (Modern 
Asian Studies, forthcoming). Table 2.
37. K ITL V  H 73, van Hoorn, "Corte beschrijvinge," p. 32.
38. Ib id ., pp. 31-32.
39. Ib id ., p. 39 (on the great profits from opium); p. 40 (on the manufacture of 
gunpowder and tin bullets, lead being too scarce to use); p. 43 (on ship building 
on the north coast [cf. Rembang] where three master schooners were built for the 
V O C ; and on salt production); p. 46 (on the Chinese as market gardeners); Ong 
Tae-hae, Chinaman Abroad, pp. 18-19 (on opium); and Afdeling Statistiek, De Resi- 
dentie Kadoe naar de uitkomsten der Statistiek opname en andere officiele Bescheiden 
bewerkt door de Afdeling Statistiek Ter Algemeene Secretarfe (Batavia: Landsdruk- 
kerij, 1871), pp. 78-79 (on the Chinese involvement in the tobacco trade of Kedhu). 
The huge increase in opium imports from Bengal by the VOC, which jumped five 
times to 67,444 pounds, in the year after the 1677 monopoly was established, and
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Most important of all, the partial monetization of the Javanese economy seems to have 
moved ahead under their stimulus for they had a monopoly of the manufacture of 
lead p/c/s (cash), the low value, monetary token, which, according to van Hoorn, was 
in general circulation in the Mataram dominions at this tim e.1,0 In fact, Chinese-cast 
picis continued to be widely used in Central and East Java until well into the eigh­
teenth century (when they were eventually replaced by VOC copper coinage), and 
their manufacture remained the exclusive prerogative of the Chinese syahbandar of 
Cirebon, Semarang, and Surabaya, who farmed out the right to local Chinese metal­
workers, the scarce lead being supplied from VOC warehouses.1,1
The later years of Amangkurat ll's  reign saw attempts to control the increasing 
numbers of Chinese in the Mataram dominions by the appointment of local, Chinese 
officers (Kapitan Cina; Litnan Cina, etc.) who were subordinate to the Chinese 
syahbandar of Japara (post-1708, Semarang) and who had the task of managing the 
affairs of the larger settlements on the north coast. But the yearly influx of new 
immigrants was so great that the Dutch Opperhoofd (Factory Head) at Japara, Jan 
Albert Sloot (d . October 21, 1694), reckoned that there was "scarcely a village, 
even deep in the hinterland, which was not occupied and taxed" by them. Neither 
the Dutch-appointed Captain of the Chinese at Japara nor any of the local VOC offi­
cials took cognizance of what went on in these areas, according to Sloot, until one 
of the local Javanese inhabitants lodged a complaint, and then care was taken to 
leave everything as before, for fear of stirring up trouble. There were even Chi­
nese settlers to be found in the immediate environs of the Sunan's court at Karta- 
sura, and the Patih, Sindureja, was contemplating building a special kampung (resi­
dential area) for them .* 4012
The ever-changing composition of the Chinese immigrant communities in Central 
Java during these years often resulted in friction and faction fighting between vari­
ous groups, which the newly appointed Chinese officers on the north coast could do 
little to control. Some of these incidents, such as that in 1693, which led to Chinese 
rioters attacking the VOC trading post at Japara, and the "Chinese troubles" (.prang 
Cina) in Central Java in 1741-42, when the main Dutch factory at Semarang was be­
sieged, were clearly manipulated by elements in the Kartasura court who hoped to 
gain a temporary advantage against the Company.43 On the latter occasion, a major
stabilized at around 113,000 pounds per annum during the eighteenth century, is 
mentioned in James R. Rush, "Opium Farms in Nineteenth-Century Java: Institutional 
Continuity and Change in a Colonial Society, 1860-1910" (P h .D . thesis, Yale Univer­
sity, 1977), p. 16.
40. K ITL V  H 73, van Hoorn, "Corte beschrijvinge," p. 38.
41. Blusse, "Trojan Horse of Lead," p. 44.
42. De Craaf, De Moord, p. 155, n. 1; on the appointment of Chinese officers, see 
Ong Tae-hae, Chinaman Abroad, pp. 4, 8-9, 29 ("Th e  flowery Chinese and every 
description of foreigners have all got Captains [Kapitan] placed over them, who are 
charged with the regulation of affairs belonging to their own countrymen, while 
great offences and capital crimes are all given over to the Dutch to decide. The 
laws and regulations are carefully drawn up and rigidly executed, which is one 
cause of their perpetuity"). At another place (p . 8) he described the ceremony for 
the appointment of a Kapitan and commented that it was in this way that the Dutch 
(described by him elsewhere [p . 3] as "deep-schemed and thoughtful") got "our 
people into their net."
43. De Graaf, De Moord, pp. 156-58 (on the 1693 incident); and M. C . Ricklefs, 
"The Crisis of 1740-1 in Java: The Javanese, Chinese, Madurese and Dutch, and 
the Fall of the Court of Kartasura," BKI 139 (1983) : 268-90.
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debate took place amongst the senior officials of the Sunan's administration about 
whether the kraton should side with the Chinese or seize the opportunity of the 
VOC's temporary military weakness to wring political concessions from Batavia. 
Although Pakubuwana ll's ( r .  1726-49) downright incompetence and foolishness 
meant that neither of these courses was followed with any success and the court it­
self fell to the Chinese rebels in June 1742, the actual debate, as related in the main 
Javanese source, sheds some interesting light on the views of the Javanese (and 
Sino-Javanese) administrative elite towards the Chinese during this period. Thus, 
while some Kartasura officials apparently saw nothing wrong in aligning with the 
Chinese forces outside Semarang, others, like the astute senior administrator of the 
western pasisir region, Jayaningrat, himself a Chinese (see above), remarked that 
his countrymen were no match for the Dutch forces in terms of war materiel. In his 
words, the Chinese had "fangs of tin" (a reference to the tin bullets used by them 
for want of lead and iron) whereas the Company had "fangs of iro n ."1*5 Still others, 
like the Sunan's vassal lord of West Madura, Pang^ran Adipati Cakraningrat IV ( r .  
1718-46), who, by an impolitic oversight on Pakubuwana IPs part, had not been 
originally consulted over the court's policy towards the Chinese, subsequently de­
clared with disdain that "the Chinese were mangy dogs who licked up the waste of 
Java's table" and that a grave dishonor would ensue if the Sunan allied with them.
He subsequently threw in his lot with the VOC, and swept through East Java with 
his Madurese armies, killing Chinese as he w ent.1,6
But the prang Cina was clearly a crisis situation in which Chinese and Javanese 
found themselves pitted against each other for political reasons. In times of peace, 
matters were rather different. Despite occasional problems over village leases and 
tollgate disputes,1*7 Sino-Javanese relations, especially in the areas of older Chinese 
settlement on the north coast, remained amicable. The new Hokkien immigrants were 
themselves from a hardy and active stock, and later formed something of an "aristoc­
racy" amongst the Chinese resident in the "South Seas" (N anyang). ii8 Many were 
imbued with a good understanding of their own Confucian culture, and some also 
developed a rare appreciation of Javanese civilization. An example of this is the 
imaginative way in which the Chinese pasisir communities were able to adapt and de­
velop traditional Javanese bathik patterns using Chinese motifs. One has only to 
think here of the splendid mega-mendhung (storm cloud) and wadhas Cina (Chinese 
rock) designs in the cloths from the Cirebon region (kain Cirebonan), and the 
chi'lin (Chinese mythological half-dog, half-lion) figure in the exquisite kain Lase- 
man, Chinese peranakan-designed bathik from the old port settlement at Lasem.1*9 
The Cantonese (Kwong Fu) were generally less refined, but they too were accepted 456789
44. Ib id ., pp. 274-79.
45. Ib id ., p. 275; and above n. 39 on the Chinese manufacture of tin bullets.
46. Ricklefs, "C risis," p. 279.
47. An example of the latter can be found in ARA Koloniaal Archief 1650 ( Overgeko-  
mende Brieven uit Batavia, 1701), f. 21 (2de Register), Vaandrager Beylwits (Sema­
rang) to Resident Van de Plas (Semarang), October 23, 1701 which related the ac­
count of a serious riot between the Chinese and Javanese communities in Semarang 
occasioned by a tollgate dispute. I am grateful to drs. Luuk Nagtegaal of Utrecht 
University for having brought this reference to my attention.
48. Purcell, Chinese in Southeast Asia, pp. 411-12.
49. Paramita R. Abdurachman, ed ., Cerbon (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1982), pp. 
148-49; and Mattiebelle Gittinger, Splendid Symbols. Textiles and Tradition in Indo­
nesia (New Haven: Eastern Press, 1979), pp. 135-37.
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more easily into local Indonesian society than their countrymen who came to the 
archipelago, often as coolies, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—  
the Hokschias and Hakkas (Kehs) from Kwangtung, and the Teochius and Hokschius 
from Fukien. 50
Reference has already been made above to the facility with which many of the 
descendants of these new immigrants embraced Islam and created a Chinese perana- 
kan culture which had many affinities with the Javanese-lslamic world in which they 
lived. Besides the obvious commercial advantages flowing from this choice ( i .e . ,  a 
closer rapport with the local population and a greater acceptability as middlemen and 
tax-farm ers), two considerations, above all others, appear to have been decisive. 
The first was financial. By embracing Islam and becoming, what in contemporary 
Dutch documents were termed, "shaven" Chinese (geschoren Chineezen; i .e .,  hav­
ing all their head hair cut off except for a long pigtail at the back [Ja v. "kucir 
C/no"]), the seventeenth century Chinese immigrants and their descendants could 
escape the tax levied by the VOC on all those who still wore their hair in the style 
of the defunct Ming dynasty, namely rolled into a stiff bun (Ja v. "kondhe") behind 
the ears. 51 This impost, known as the "wang kondhe," along with the poll-tax levied 
on all registered Chinese settlers, were the main fiscal burdens imposed by the Dutch 
on the immigrant communities at this time. Both might be avoided if the newcomers 
or their descendants could assimilate successfully into the indigenous Javanese cul­
ture. 52
The second major consideration influencing this choice stemmed from the nature 
of Chinese immigrant society in Java. Because of the paucity of Chinese women 
available and the tiny numbers of Chinese females who accompanied their menfolk 
overseas before the third decade of the twentieth century, most of the newly arrived 
Hokkiens and Kwong Fus married peranakan, children of marriages between Chinese 
men and Javanese women, or took their wives directly from the lower echelons of 
Javanese society. A knowledge of indigenous culture, language, and customs was 
thus imbibed by the peranakan offspring of these unions almost from birth, and they 
grew up in a family environment which enabled them to accommodate easily to the 
majority Javanese world in which they lived and worked. The overwhelming influ­
ence of the distaff side of these peranakan Chinese families can hardly be overesti­
mated.
So the mestigo cultural pattern of the older period of Chinese settlement in Java 
was maintained, with the peranakan Chinese communities increasing apace in the late
50. Purcell, Chinese in Southeast Asia, pp. 387-88.
51. Budiman, Masyarakat Islam Tionghoa, pp. 32-34. Many Chinese immigrants 
(especially Hokkiens) to Indonesia in the seventeenth century appear to have fled 
their homeland to escape the Manchus. They thus arrived with the hairstyle of the 
Ming period. Later, however, immigrants from China already wore their hair shaven 
with a pigtail ( tauwtjhang) since this style was enforced on the Chinese mainland 
when the Manchu (C h 'ing) dynasty established full control over the Han Chinese. 
According to Budiman (p . 34), the term "Cina kuciran" (Chinese with pigtails) then 
referred specifically to new arrivals as opposed to the peranakan who had already 
become assimilated to some degree into indigenous Javanese society. At the time of 
the Java War ( 1825-30), the hairstyle of the Chinese again became an issue when 
Dipanagara ordered that all those who wished to become Muslims should be circum­
cised and have their pigtails cut, see Louw, De Java-Oorlog , 1: 732 (Appendix 58).
52. Budiman, Masyarakat Islam Tionghoa, pp. 32-34; and The Siauw Giap, "Chinese 
Assimilation," pp. 70-73.
Plate 2. A Chinese noodle (bakmf) seller and his assistant in early nineteenth 
century Java. Sketch by the Belgian artist, A . A . J . Payen (1792-1853). 
Photograph from the A . A . J . Payen Collection (Sketchbook E) by courtesy 
of the Rijksmuseum voor Volkenkunde, Leiden.
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. By the 1780s the aforementioned Ong Tae- 
hae hazarded an informed guess that there were already about 100,000 inhabitants 
of Chinese descent in the island,53 54a figure which accords well with the more de­
tailed statistics provided by Raffles in 1815, when the combined full-blood and pera- 
nakan Chinese communities amounted to just over 2 percent of the total population 
of Java and Madura. 5l* Well over half of these were domiciled in the colonial capital 
and the Ommelanden, and the port of Batavia continued to handle the bulk of the 
immigrants, who were apparently arriving on junks from Amoy and Canton at the 
rate of about 1,000 souls a year. 55
The concentration by contemporary commentators like van Hoorn and Ong Tae-hae 
on the prominent role of the Chinese in trade and commerce should not disguise the fact 
that they also occasionally occupied positions of great responsibility in the Javanese 
kingdoms, forging connections with the highest reaches of the indigenous aristocra­
cy. The case of the Jayaningrat family in Pekalongan in the first half of the eigh­
teenth century has already been referred to. Earlier, Sultan Agung appointed a 
Chinese trader in Lasem by the name of Cik Go Ing, a servant of the then Sino- 
Javanese Bupati of Lasem, Singawijaya, to succeed his master,as a reward for his 
services during the Mataram campaigns against Surabaya (1620-25). As was usual 
with such promotions in the Mataram administrative hierarchy, he was given a Java­
nese name and title, that of Tumenggung Mertaguna, and many subsequent Bupati 
of Lasem and the adjacent north coast regions of Tuban, Kudus, Blora, and Bojana- 
gara (Rajegwesi) were drawn from his descendants, the latter being allied by mar­
riage to prominent Chinese peranakan families on the pasisir, as well as with mem­
bers of the princely courts of Ja v a .56 Further west, in Cirebon, an official Dutch 
report of 1711 mentions how close the integration between Chinese and high-born 
Javanese had become in court circles. 57 Indeed, it was precisely at the Cirebon 
courts (Kasepuhan and Kanoman) that the system of renting out lands to the local 
Chinese had proceeded furthest and where the earliest uprisings against the tax- 
farmers and their elite sponsors took place in the early nineteenth c e n tu ry .58 Else­
where, in Semarang and East Java, similar instances can be found of Chinese mer­
chants marrying into the ranks of the Javanese nobility and achieving high adminis­
trative office.59 At the same time, little stigma appears to have been attached to
53. Ong Tae-hae, Chinaman Abroad, p. 2.
54. See Appendix 1.
55. Thomas Stamford Raffles, The History of Java, vol. 1 (London: Black, Par- 
berry S Allen, 1817), p. 74; and see also John Crawfurd, A Descriptive Dictionary 
of the Indian Islands and Adjacent Countries (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University 
Press, 1971), pp. 94-98 sub: "China." Earlier, at the time of the attacks on the 
Chinese tax-farmers in Cirebon (1802-6), the Dutch authorities had hazarded a 
guess that there were some 25,000 Chinese peranakan in Central and East Java, see 
Dj. B r. 49, N. Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to N . Engelhard (Semarang), November 30, 1803.
56. T h . G. T h . Pigeaud, Literature of Java. Catalogue Raisonne of Javanese Manu­
scripts in the Library of the University of Leiden and other Public Collections in the 
Netherlands, vol. 4 (Leiden : Leiden University Press, 1980) : 244-45, where he refers to 
a loose addenda on the life of Tumenggung Mertaguna of Lasem in K ITLV  Or 409 
(Memoirs of Ko Ho Sing of Yogyakarta).
57. ARA Koloniaal Archief 1705 ( Overgekomende Brieven uit Batavia, 1712), pp. 
74-75. I am grateful to Mr. A . R. T .  Kemasang for this reference.
58. See above n. 10.
59. See Ricklefs, "C risis," p. 272; and Heather Sutherland, "Notes on Java's
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casual liaisons between Javanese rulers and attractive Chinese (peranakan) women. 
Amangkurat II, renowned throughout Java as a womanizer and philanderer, appar­
ently seduced the wives and daughters of the Chinese merchants in Japara during 
his temporary residence there in 1677-78, just as he acted throughout his reign 
with the womenfolk of his Javanese subjects. 60
The Chinese also seem to have made major contributions in the field of military 
skills and technology during this period. At the time of the conquest of Giri by 
Pangeran Pekik of Surabaya in 1636, Javanese accounts relate that the priest-king 
of Giri could call on the help of an elite force of 250 Chinese sharpshooters command­
ed by one of his adopted sons, a Muslim Chinese by the name of Endrasena.61 The 
large numbers of rich Chinese Muslim merchants and artisans who are known to have 
lived in the nearby port city of Gresik from at least the late fourteenth century is 
of interest here, for the harbor entrepot was later renowned as a major armaments 
center, where large caliber brass canon (culverins), firearms, and gunpowder were 
manufactured. 62 In 1678, during Admiral Anthonio Hurdt's final siege of the Madu­
rese rebel Raden Trunajaya's (d . 1680) stronghold at Kedhiri, a Chinese command­
er is again mentioned amongst the latter's forces defending the town, and it is likely 
that this man was skilled in the handling of firearm s.63 64 The Chinese were also adept 
in special types of martial arts such as the single-stick fencing and swinging (pgn- 
cak; main tipi) long taught in Chinese-Buddhist m o n a s te r ie s .T h e re  are refer­
ences to these Chinese adepts ( " vechtersbazen") during the 1691-93 conspiracy 
between the Chinese and the Javanese Bupati on the north coast,65 and in Yogya- 
karta, before the Java Warj Dipanagara's own bodyguard are said to have been 
trained in this technique of self-defense probably by the ex-Kapitan Cina, Tan 
Jin Sing. 66
As has been noted above, a great deal more research still needs to be done be­
fore any firm conclusions can be drawn concerning the exact nature of Sino-Javanese
Regent Families, Part I ,"  Indonesia, no. 16 (October 1973), p. 135 (on Mas Tumeng- 
gung Astrawijaya (? Sastrawijaya), a Sino-Javanese Bupati of Semarang at the time 
of the prang Cina who deserted the Dutch and made common cause with the Chinese 
rebels besieging the c ity ), and ib id ., pp. 145-46 (on the descendants of the Chinese 
Muslim, Han Hin Song, who occupied many important official positions in East Java 
until 1818). For further details on Astra(Sastra)wijaya, see H. J . de Craaf, "De 
Regenten van Semarang ten tijde van d e V .O .C .,  1682-1809," BKI 134 (1978): 302-3.
60. H. J .  de Craaf, "De Regering van Sunan Mangku-Rat I Tegal-Wangi, Vorst van 
Mataram, 1646-1677. II. Opstand en Ondergang," VKI 39 (1962): 4; and idem, "De 
expeditie van Anthonio Hurdt, Raad van Indie, also Admiraal en Superintendent 
naar de Binnenlanden van Java, Sept.-Dec. 1678, volgens het journaal van Johan 
Jurgen Briel, secretaris," De Linschoten-Vereeniging 72 (1971): 60.
61. De Craaf, "Sultan Agung," p. 215; The Siauw Giap, "Chinese Assimilation," p. 
70; and Budiman, Masyarakat Islam Tionghoa, ch. 3.
62. Raffles, History, 1: 296; and J . J . Stockdale, Sketches Civil and Military of 
the Island of Java, 2nd rev. ed. (London: Stockdale, 1812), pp. 383, 387.
63. De Craaf, "De expeditie van Anthonio H urdt," pp. 204, 220.
64. Beryl de Zoete and Walter Spies, Dance and Drama in Bali (Kuala Lumpur: Ox­
ford University Press, 1973), p. 252.
65. De Craaf, De Moord, pp. 156-57.
66. Carey, ed. and trans., Babad Dipanagara, pp. 28-29; 253, n. 73.
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relations during this period. What evidence there is seems to suggest that up to 
the late eighteenth century, the Javanese elite enjoyed many contacts with the Chi­
nese communities and made full use of the skills and talents which the latter had to 
offer. This was especially noticeable in the fields of tax-farm administration, com­
mercial enterprise, and military expertise. Much less is known about the world of 
the Javanese villages, and it is likely that here very different attitudes towards the 
Chinese began to emerge as the nature of peranakan commercial competition and eco­
nomic exploitation started to make itself felt. But, until the early nineteenth cen­
tury (e .g .,  in Cirebon), there are no indications that the ever-increasing Chinese 
peranakan presence in the Central Javanese hinterland aroused any widespread 
feelings of bitterness and discontent.
3. The Chinese in the Central Javanese Kingdoms in the Post-Giyanti 
Period, with Special Reference to the Years 1808-1812
Between the settlement at Ciyanti (1755) and the British attack on Yogyakarta 
in June 1812, Chinese formed a smaller percentage'of the inhabitants of the Central 
Javanese kingdoms than of most other regions of the island.67 Fairly accurate sta­
tistics of the number of Chinese males over the age of fourteen were compiled by 
the Kapitan Cina of Surakarta and Yogyakarta in May 1808 in response to a re­
quest from Governor-General Daendels (in office, 1808-11). 68 These indicate 
that there were some 1,282 Chinese males living in the Sunan's dominions and 758 in 
the Sultanate, or 0.54 percent and 0.36 percent respectively of the total adult male 
population of those two states. This was about, or rather less than, half, of the 
average for Central and East Java taken together, and fell far short of the 2.04 
percent average for the whole island, the latter figure being distorted by the 
uniquely high percentage of Chinese in and around Batavia.69 The comparatively 
small number of Chinese living in the Central Javanese principalities is a factor 
which must always be borne in mind when assessing the changing relationships be­
tween the Javanese and Chinese communities during these years (1755-1812). Most 
of the Chinese living in the territories of the princes at that time were apparently 
also conversant with Javanese ways, and usually spoke Malay (the lingua franca of 
the Dutch administration) and a smattering of Javanese. 70 This was a very differ­
ent situation from that prevailing in the years immediately prior to the Java War, 
especially from the restoration of the Dutch administration in 1816,to 1825, when the 
lure of quick tollgate and tax-farm profits attracted large numbers of newly arrived 
Chinese immigrants to the princely states, most of whom had no knowledge of local 
conditions and were barely conversant in vulgar, "market" (pasar) Malay, let alone 
Javanese. 71
67. See Appendix 1.
68. Dj. B r. 86, Tan Jin Sing, "Generaale Lyst van zoodanige Chineesen," May 1808 
(on Yogyakarta); and ARA van Alphen-Engelhard coll. (aanwinsten 1900) 235, 
Nicolaus Engelhard, "Speculatieve Memorie over zaken betreffende het Bestuur over 
Java's Noord-Oost Kust," May 1808 (on Surakarta).
69. See Appendix 1.
70. Ong Tae-hae, Chinaman Abroad, p. 33; and John Hoffman, "A Foreign Invest­
ment: Indies Malay to 1901," Indonesia, no. 27 (April 1979), pp. 65-92.
71. K ITL V  H 395, P. F. H. Chevallier, "Rapport over de werking der tolpoorten, 
n .a .v . een ingekomen klacht tegen de Chinees Tan Tjoe Hong," June 13, 1824; and 
see further below pt. 5.
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In 1808, however, this was still all in the future. The statistical figures for 
Yogyakarta in that year give a good idea of the spread of the Chinese population in 
the Sultan's territories and their main sources of employment. Thus out of the total 
of 758 adult males whose location can be traced with any certainty, 184 resided in 
Kedhu, 128 in Bagel&n, 116 in the core province of Mata ram, 65 in Yogyakarta 
proper, 56 in the eastern outlying regions (mancanagara), 40 in Pajang ( i . e. ,  in 
Yogya lands near Surakarta), and 37 in the provinces bordering the Dutch-con- 
trolled north coast such as Grobogan, Wirasari, and Purwadadi.72 The compara­
tively large numbers of Chinese in Kedhu and Bagel£n are interesting,for Kedhu in 
particular was renowned at this time for its Chinese tax-farmers and revenue collec­
tors ( Demang; Mantrf D6sa) who had rented out lands from needy princes at the 
courts in return for mortgages or financial loans. 73 74 According to the British Resi­
dent of Yogyakarta, John Crawfurd (1783-1868; in office, 1811-14/1816), who drew 
up a report on the province in November 1812 after its annexation by the British, 
the condition of the ordinary Javanese peasants living under these Chinese collec­
tors was considerably worse than of those in areas still controlled by Javanese reve­
nue officials. The main reason, according to Crawfurd, was because the lands were 
usually let to the Chinese at much higher rents, and they were thus forced to re­
coup their initial cash outlay by demanding harsher terms from their Javanese ten­
ants. 71* Crawfurd's report, however, should not be accepted at face value. It is 
known that he was not personally very well disposed towards the Chinese, 75 and 
there are indications from other areas that Chinese tax-farmers were not always 
viewed as oppressors by the local population. At Wirasaba in East Java, for exam­
ple, the principal Chinese land renter. Lib Sing, who controlled over 200 villages, 
was reported to have been "a kind and indulgent master" under whom the wong 
cilik (common people) liked to take service because the "villages and lands in his 
area were better looked after than elsewhere."76 A Dutch traveler made similar 
comments about the Chinese tollgate keeper at the ferry crossing at Kreteg on the 
Opak river to the south of Yogyakarta, who "seemed the very best sort of tollgate
72. Dj. B r. 86, Tan Jin Sing, "Generaale Lyst van zoodanige Chineesen," May 1808.
73. Mackenzie Private Collection, India Office Library & Records, London [henceforth 
IOL Mack. P r.) 21 pt. 8, J . Crawfurd, "Report upon the District of Cadoe," Novem­
ber 15, 1812, p. 301; Afdeling Statistiek, De Residentie Kadoe, p. 78; and ARA, 
Ministerie van Kolonien (Ministry of the Colonies Archive, in the Algemeen Rijksar- 
chief) [henceforth MvK] 4219, Geheim en Kabinets Archief, September 20, 1830 no. 
56k, "Verbaal van de verrigtingen van Kommissarissen van Djokjakarta en Aanteeke- 
ningen gehouden in de comparitien ter zake van hunne Kommissie met onderscheidene 
personen," Magelang, April 13, 1830, interviews with Pangeran Mangkudiningrat II 
(Yogyakarta), April 13, 1830; and Haji Ngisa, April 21, 1830.
74. IOL Mack. Pr. 21 pt. 8, Crawfurd, "Report upon the District of Cadoe," pp. 
300-302.
75. On Crawfurd's anti-Chinese sentiments, see F. de Haan, "Personalia der Periode 
van het Engelsch Bestuur over Java 1811-1816," BKI 92 (1935): 529.
76. IOL Mack. Pr. 21 pt. 10, Lt. H. C . Jourdan, "Report on Japan and Wirosobo," 
April 28, 1813, p. 361. Similar comments were made about the Chinese land-renters 
of Ulujami near Pekalongan (the rice "granary" of Semarang according to Ong Tae- 
hae, Chinaman Abroad, p. 13), Tan Lek Ko (Kapitan Cina of Semarang) and his son. 
Tan Jo Ok, see Java's Noord-Oost Kust [archive of the government of Java's North­
east Coast— late 1600s to 1808], Arsip Nasional R . I . ,  Jakarta [henceforth AN Java 
NOK 1], P. C . van Overstraten, "Memorie met derzelver Bylaagen tot naricht voor 
den Heer Johan Frederik Baron van Reede tot de Parkeler aankomend Couverneur 
en Directeur van Java's Noord-Oost Kust," October 13, 1796.
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keeper," and whose subordinates appeared "healthy and ro b u st."77 It is useful to 
bear these descriptions in mind by way of contrast to the reports penned by Euro­
pean contemporaries about the Chinese tax-farmers and tollgate keepers in adjacent 
areas on the eve of the Java War, when great abuses were uncovered and the Java­
nese vilified the Chinese as a whole as a "race of customs' house keepers" (bangsa 
bandar). 78
If we return to the 1808 statistics on the employment patterns of the Chinese 
community in Yogya, the total number of tax-farmers and land renters can be seen 
in perspective. The relevant details are as follows: in charge of the total Chinese 
community were two Kapitan Cina (Tan Jin Sing in Yogyakarta, and his brother.
Tan Tin  Sing, at the important market center of Paduresa near Temanggung, north­
ern Kedhu). Below them were forty-eight tollgate keepers, 79 219 coolies attached 
to the tollgates, 397 traders and middlemen, th irty-six  land renters, ten scribes, 
three schoolmasters (shades of Ong Tae -hae!), three sugar factory owners (at Kala- 
san and Mlathi in Mataram, and Medana [Bedono] in northern K e d h u ),80 two paint­
ers, two carpenters, one gambling house keeper (in Yogyakarta), one butcher, and 
the rest young men or adolescents still living with their parents.81 It is true that 
many Chinese living in the principalities before 1812 rented small allotments from 
the kraton as vegetable plots and market gardens, but these were usually situated 
close to the royal capitals and were too restricted in area to have much effect on the 
land tenure structure of adjacent Javanese villages. 82
At the courts themselves, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
the good relations which appear to have characterized Javanese elite dealings with 
the Chinese communities in previous years, were maintained. Many of the Javanese 
princes recognized the value of the Chinese as money-lenders, tax-farmers, rice-
77. K ITL V  H 503, J . I. van Sevenhoven, "Aanteekeningen gehouden op eene reis 
over Java van Batavia naar de Oosthoek in . . . 1812" (ed. F. de Haan), pp. 135-36.
78. "Bundel Solo Brieven" [volume of letters in the Surakarta Residency archive of 
the Arsip Nasional, Jakarta] [henceforth S. B r . ]  170, J . I. van Sevenhoven, H. 
MacGillavry and A . H. Smissaert (Commissarissen belast met het Onderzoek in de 
Regering der tolpoorten, de administratie der vogelnestjes en het oprigten eenen 
Landraad in de Residentien Soerakarta en Jokjokarta) [henceforth "Commissioners"] 
to C . A .G .  Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia), October 24, 1824. The Dutch transla­
tion of the Javanese expression was "linie van douanen."
79. This would indicate that all the tollgates in the Sultan's dominions were in the 
hands of the Chinese in 1808. For a full list of the tollgates in Yogyakarta in the 
1808-25 period, see Appendix 3.
80. On the Chinese-run sugar factories at Kalasan and Mlathi near Yogyakarta, 
which used traditional methods of extraction, see Louw, De Java-Oorlog , 1: 247; 
and Appendix 2. The Yogya Kapitan Cina, Tan Jin Sing (in office, 1803-13), ap­
pears to have owned the other main factory near Medana (Bedono) in northern Ke­
dhu, see IOL Mack. Pr. 21 pt. 4, J . Crawfurd, "Sultan's Country. Observations on 
the Nature and Resources of the Territories under the authority of the Sultan of 
Mataram," 1812, p. 77; Dj. B r. 48, J . G. van den Berg (Yogyakarta) to N. Engel­
hard (Semarang), February 14, 1802; and Appendix 2.
81. Dj. B r. 86, Tan Jin Sing, "Generaale Lyst van zoodanige Chineesen," May 1808.
82. S. B r. 131, "Minuut Verbaal van het verhandelde door de Kommissie belast met 
de verevening der zaken van de verhuurde Landerijen in de Residentie Soerakarta 
en Djocjocarta,"  February 3, 1824.
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brokers, and businessmen. In Surakarta, both the Sunan and the Head of the Mang- 
kunegaran House had contracts with the Chinese, as well as with the Dutch Resi­
dents, for the sale of a fixed quantity of rice every year after the tribute payments 
{in natura) had come in from their appanage lands.83 They also relied heavily, 
along with other members of their families, on Chinese and European money-lenders 
to tide them over periodic financial difficulties. During the reign of the spendthrift 
Pakubuwana IV ( r .  1788-1820), this reliance became such a problem that the colonial 
government had to intervene periodically to pay off the court's debts.84 In Yogya- 
karta, at least during the reigns of the first two Sultans (Hamengkubuwana I, 1749— 
1792; and Hamengkubuwana II, 1792—1810/1811 — 12/1826—28), the kraton finances re­
mained in a slightly healthier state, 85 but even here it is clear that the Yogya rulers 
depended on the local Chinese, from the very inception of the state, for the efficient 
tax-farming of the tollgates and markets in their lands, a crucial source of royal 
revenue which represented about 40 percent of annual fiscal returns in 1808. 86 In­
deed, as will be seen shortly, it was precisely in this area of tollgate and tax-farm 
administration that the first signs of serious strain between the Javanese and Chinese 
communities began to appear in 1812 at the time of the British attack on Yogyakarta. 87
83. Ann Kumar, "Javanese Court Society and Politics in the Late Eighteenth Cen­
tu ry : The Record of a Lady Soldier, Part I: The Religious, Social, and Economic 
Life of the C o u rt,"  Indonesia, no. 29 (April 1980), pp. 30-31.
84. On the debts of the Surakarta courts to Chinese and European money-lenders 
during this period, see (for the Mangkunegaran), J . A . van der Chijs, ed ., Neder- 
landsch-lndisch Plakaatboek, 1602-1811, vol. 16 (Th e  Hague: Nijhoff, 1897): 73-76, 
Order (Besluit) of 10 Sprokkelmaand (February) 1809; and (for the Kasunanan), 
see H. W. Daendels, Staat der Nederlandsche Oostindische Bezittingen, onder het 
Bestuur van den Gouverneur-Ceneraal Herman Willem Daendels, Ridder, Luitenant- 
Generaal &c. in de jaren 1808-1811 (The  Hague: Van Cleef, 1814), Appendix 2, 
Additionele Stukken no. 27 art. 3 (on the payment of Pakubuwana IV's debts under 
the terms of the treaty of January 6, 1811). For a list of the debts of both the 
Surakarta courts at the end of the Java War, see AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur- 
Generaal, November 13, 1830 no. 11, Litt. D, "Generale Zamentrekking der schul- 
den van het Hof van Soerakarta," June 1830, which gives a total debt of 1.2 million 
guilders; see also Dj. B r. 65A, "Extract uit eene Lyst van debiteuren aan den 
boedel van wylen den Chinees Ongke," 1830; and de Klerck, De Java-Oorlog van 
1825-30, 6: 148-51.
85. On the 196,320 silver reals (1 ronde real = f. 2.80) taken by Daendels as prize 
money from Yogya in January 1811, see Daendels, Staat, Appendix 2, Additionele 
Stukken no. 25; and on the 800,000 Spanish dollars (1 S p .D . = f. 2.56) taken by 
Raffles as booty in June 1812, see Peter Carey, ed .. The Archive of Yogyakarta.
Vol. I. Documents Relating to Politics and Internal Court Affairs (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1980), p. 12, n. 4.
86. On the total Yogya revenue returns and outgoings in 1808, see C . E. van 
Kesteren, "Een bijdrage tot de geschiedenis van den Java-oorlog," De Indische 
Gids, 9, 2 (1887), Appendix 3, pp. 1315-18. Van Kesteren's figures are taken 
from H. M. de Kock private collection (AR A) [henceforth dK] 145, M. Waterloo to N. 
Engelhard, March 22, 1808 in Waterloo, "Memorie van Overgave," April 4, 1808.
For a brief overview of the history of the Yogyakarta tax-farm between 1755 and 
c. 1810, see Dj. B r. 86, M. Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to N. Engelhard (Semarang), 
January 19, 1805; and IOL Mack. Pr. 21 pt. 4, Crawfurd, "Sultan's C ountry ," p. 
134.
87. See below pts. 4 and 5.
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Contacts with the Chinese in court circles were by no means limited to purely 
business and financial matters. In Surakarta, Pakubuwana IV's younger brother, 
Pangferan Mangkubumi (exiled to Ambon 1816-24; d. 1827), an ambitious and unscru­
pulous character, maintained close ties with the Surakarta Kapitan Cina, Si Ting Ho, 
who would often visit him in his princely residence (dalem). There were even ru­
mors that he was endeavoring to use the Chinese for his own political ends, and in 
1803 his name was linked with a supposed Chinese "conspiracy" on his lands in Ban- 
yumas, which, on investigation, merely turned out to be an oath-taking ceremony 
amongst Chinese refugees from the disturbances in Cirebon, who were setting up a 
mutual aid association (kongsi) in that region.8 9 On a lighter note, it appears that 
Mangkubumi evinced a particular interest in Chinese firework displays (e .g .,  at 
Chinese New Year and at special court festivities), events which were very popular 
at both royal capitals.90 Chinese-derived card games, dicing, and other sorts of 
gambling patronized by the Chinese, likewise attracted participants from the kra - 
ton, and were amongst the ways in which the elite Javanese and Chinese communities 
interacted socially during these years. 91
It was the same in Yogyakarta, where contemporary sources indicate that 
Sino-Javanese relations at the elite level often transcended strictly commercial 
concerns. The second Sultan, for example, retained a Chinese herbalist (abdi-  
Dalem dhukun Cina) as his personal physician, 92 and one of his favorite secondary 
wives. Mas Ayu Sumarsonawati, was of partly Chinese descent. 93 Her son.
88. ARA van Alphen-Engelhard coll., 239, J . G. van den Berg, "Copia Memorie 
op het Hoff van Souracarta . . . aan den Wei Edele Agtbaare Heer Bogislaus Frede- 
ricus von Liebeherr," August 1806.
89. Dj. B r. 49, M. Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to N. Engelhard (Semarang), November 
30, 1803; S. B r. 14A, J . C . van den Berg (Surakarta) toM . Waterloo (Yogyakarta), 
November 9, 1803.
90. ARA van Alphen-Engelhard 239, van den Berg, "Copia Memorie," August 1806; 
Dj. B r. 24, J . Groenhoff van Wortmann, "Dagverhaal van het voorgevallene ter 
gelegenheid van de komst alhier van Z. E. den Heer Maarschalk en Gouverneur- 
Generaal H. W. Daendels," August 17, 1809 (entry for July 30, 1809, for a descrip­
tion of the firework display put on for Daendels by the Kapitan Cina in the Resi­
dency garden); and Sana Budaya MS. A . 135 (Babad Ngayogyakarta, vol. 1), X C V III. 
40, p. 402 (on the special firework display arranged by the ex-Kapitan Cina, Tan 
Jin Sing [Secadiningrat], on the northern alun-alun to mark the occasion of Sultan 
Hamengkubuwana I V's wedding in May 1816).
91. On the Chinese card games and games of chance (main po; main posing; main 
dadu;and main kartu) which were popular in Java at this time, see Musium Pusat 
(Jakarta), Malay MS. ML 97 ("Schetsen over den oorlog op Java 1825-30 opgesteld 
door den Bopatti van Karang Anjar Raden Adipatti Ario Djajadiningrat, 1855-57"), 
p. 5; and Carey, e d ., Babad Dipanagara, p. 250,n. 60. For a more general over­
view, see Tjan Tjoe Siem, "Javaanse Kaartspelen: Bijdrage tot de Beschrijving van 
Land en Volk," Verhandelingen van het [ Koninklijk] Bataviaasch Genootschap van 
Kunsten en Wetenschappen [Jakarta] [henceforth VBG ] 75, no. 1 (1941): 1-168.
92. British Library Additional Manuscript (London) [henceforth BL Add. M S.]
12341 (Crawfurd collection: original letters and land grants etc. from the Yogya 
court), f. 76v. This document will be edited in the second volume of The Archive  
of Yogyakarta (above n. 85) which will be published in 1988.
93. W. Palmer van den Broek, ed. and trans. "Geschiedenis van het Vorstenhuis 
Madoera uit het Javaansch vertaald," Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land- en
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Pang§ran Jayakusuma (c . 1787-1829), who subsequently became one of Dipanagara's 
principal army commanders during the Java War under the title of Pangeran Ngabehi, 
was described in a Maduro-Javanese chronicle as a "well built, intelligent and dis­
cerning nobleman" who had inherited the pale yellow skin of his m other.91 *94 This 
kulit langseb (yellow-white) complexion was viewed as the height of female beauty 
at the courts, and the second Sultan apparently set such store by it that he used 
to send raiding parties out to the north coast to capture attractive peranakan Chi­
nese women for his female retinue. 95
Just as had been the case during the "Chinese troubles" (prang Cina) in 1741- 
1742, so in these years it seems that the Chinese were occasionally regarded as 
potential allies against the Dutch. The most striking example of this attitude oc­
curred during the short-lived revolt of the charismatic senior administrator (Bupati 
Wedana) of the Sultan's eastern outlying provinces, Radfen Rongga Prawiradirja III 
(c. 1779-1810; in office, 1796-1810), in November-December 1810. The detailed 
background to this rebellion need not detain us here, although the main issues ap­
pear to have been the increasingly oppressive role of the Europeans in the timber 
trade in East Java (an outcome of Daendels1 demands for teak supplies for his ambi­
tious fortification projects in the Madura Straits), rivalry between Rongga and his 
Surakarta opposite number in the eastern mancanagara, deep political divisions 
within the Yogya kraton, and Daendels' determination to extinguish Rad&n Rongga's 
political influence in the Sultanate. 96
Prior to his rebellion, Rongga appears to have enjoyed close relations with the 
Chinese communities in East Java principally through his position as the Sultan's 
chief tollgate-leaser in the Madiun area .97 He also shared their misgivings about 
the threat posed to local economic interests, especially in the timber trade, by the
Volkenkunde uitgegeven door het [Koninklijk] Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten
en Wetenschappen [Jakarta] [henceforth TB G ] 24 (1877): 87; and K. R. T .  Man-
doyokusumo, Serat Raja Putra Ngayogyakarta Hadiningrat (Ngayogyakarta: Bebadan 
Museum Karaton Ngayogyakarta Hadiningrat, 1977), p. 21, n. 30.
94. Van den Broek, "Geschiedenis van het Vorstenhuis Madoera," p. 87.
95. Dj. B r. 48, J . G. van den Berg (Yogyakarta) to N. Engelhard (Semarang),
July 5, 1802. The raids may have had some connection with the recruitment of 
attractive women for the second Sultan's "Amazon Corps" (Prajurit Estri; Pasukan 
Langenkusuma) of which he was inordinately fond. For a description of Ratu Anom, 
Pakubuwana Vi's  ( r .  1823-30) favorite wife, whose "porcelain" complexion recalled 
the legendary "Putri Cina" (Chinese [Champa] princess, supposedly the mother of 
Raden Patah of Demak), see van den Broek, "Geschiedenis van het Vorstenhuis 
Madoera," p. 124; and on the same Sunan's involvement with a Chinese g irl, Nonah 
Kuwi, the daughter of a rich merchant in Ambon, whom he met during his exile 
there (1830-49), see John Anthony Day, "Meanings of Change in the Poetry of Nine­
teenth Century Java" (P h .D . thesis, Cornell University, 1981), pp. 142-63.
96. For an analysis of the background of Rad&n Rongga's revolt, see P. B . R. 
Carey, "Pangeran Dipanagara and the Making of the Java War (1825-30) : The End 
of an Old Order in Java," VKl (forthcoming, 1986), ch. 4.
97. See BL Add. MS. 12342 (Crawfurd collection: original letters and land grants 
etc. from the Yogya court), f. 189r-190r (Piagem of Radfen Rongga Prawiradirja III 
for Tong Yan and Cik Panjang, Chinese bandar of Kamolan on the Sala river, 2 Mu- 
lud, AJ 1730 [Ju ly  10, 1809]). This document will be published in the second vol­
ume of The Archive of Yogyakarta (above n. 85), which will appear in 1988.
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indiscriminate activities of European loggers and entrepreneurs. Presumably it was 
on the strength of these mutual concerns that Rongga, immediately after going into 
revolt in late November 1810, proclaimed himself the "protector" of all the Javanese 
and Chinese who had been mistreated by the European government ( ingkeng sami 
kasiya-siya ing Gupernemen) and urged them to work together to "exterminate"
(anyirnakna) the Dutch officials who had undermined the well-being and prosperity 
of Java. 98 His appeal was also specifically directed to the wealthy Chinese communi­
ties on the north coast, whose support he hoped to enlist in a series of strikes 
against the main Dutch garrisons in the Rembang-Surabaya area. He thus urged 
the pasisir Chinese to take control of the offices and posts of evicted Europeans and 
guard them against possible counterattacks. 99 On December 15, 1810, just two days 
before his death and with the European-officered flying column closing on him inex­
orably, he made one last desperate plea to the Kapitan Cina of Lasem and Rembang, 
promising them that once the Europeans had been destroyed, they would enjoy his 
special protection and that their descendants would inherit their official positions.100 
It is not known how the local Chinese communities in East Java regarded these ap­
peals, although it is interesting that, when the flying column eventually caught up 
with Rongga at Sekaran on the banks of the Sala River, twelve Chinese were report­
edly amongst the hundred or so military retainers who remained loyal to h im .101
Ephemeral though it was, Rongga's revolt and his continuous attempts to involve 
the Chinese in his cause stand in marked contrast to the situation just fifteen years 
later at the time of the outbreak of the Java War. The paucity of Chinese tollgate- 
keepers in the Yogya eastern outlying provinces (when compared to the situation in 
1816-25) may partly account for this. It should also be noted that it was precisely 
the long-established, Chinese Muslim communities on the north coast, to whom Rong­
ga made his final appeal, who later afforded most support to the Javanese during D i- 
panagara's struggle against the Dutch. Nevertheless, the overwhelming differences 
between the Javanese attitudes towards the Chinese communities in East Java in 1810 
and in Central Java in 1825 are still striking. How can they be explained? To  do 
so, it is necessary to turn briefly to an event, which, in retrospect, appears to 
have been something of a catalyst for Sino-Javanese relations in Yogyakarta: the 
British attack on the Sultanate in June 1812.
4. The British Attack on Yogyakarta in June 1812 and Its Aftermath
Contemporary sources from the period of the British administration in Java give 
some indications of the bitter feelings which erupted between the Chinese and Java­
nese communities at the time of the British attack on the Yogya kraton on June 19- 
20, 1812. Writing in his official journal of his "Proceedings on the Island of Java" 
( i .e . ,  inspection tours) covering the period 1811-13, Raffles' exceedingly capable 
chief engineer, Lieutenant-Colonel Colin Mackenzie (c . 1753-1821), remarked that 
"in June 1812 . . .  all the Chinese Bundhers [bandar] or Toll Houses were destroyed 
[and] extensive habitations of the Chinaman at Prambana[n] where we were at this time
98. Carey, e d .. Archive, 1: 36-38.
99. Ib id ., p. 37.
100. Ib id ., p. 40, n. 1; and Dj. B r. 46, Proclamation of Sunan Prabu Ingalaga
(alias Raden Rongga) to Kyai Kapitan Kuci (Lasem) and Babah Kapitan Bung Sing 
(Rembang), 18 Dulkangidah AJ 1737 (December 15, 1810).
101. Dj. B r. 46, Sgt. Lucas Leberfeld (commander of flying column, Sekaran) to 
P. Engelhard (Yogyakarta), December 17, 1810.
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[January 1812] kindly lodged for 3 days [were] burnt to the g rou n d .1,102 It is unclear 
from this account whether Mackenzie was referring just to the principal tollgates 
along the main approach roads to Yogya which he reconnoitred prior to the arrival 
of the main British expeditionary force in the Sultan's capital in mid-June 1812, or 
whether all the principal tollgates in the Yogya area were put to the torch. There 
are no corroborative details from other documents to confirm what actually happened, 
apart from a brief reference in one of Crawfurd's letters written nearly two years 
after the event, which mentioned the intense antagonism evinced by the Chinese 
against the Javanese during this period.102 03 104 But even if we conclude that Mackenzie 
was talking only about the bandar on the highways leading into the capital, his evi­
dence still provides a disturbing picture of bloodshed and mayhem in which the Chi­
nese were temporarily singled out as targets of popular vengeance.
Can the arson attacks of June 1812 then be seen as a precursor of the terrible 
events of July and August 1825? To some extent the answer is no, for the immedi­
ate historical circumstances of the two periods were very different. The British 
assault on Yogya in June 1812 occurred after nearly ten months of severe political 
tension between Raffles and the recalcitrant second Sultan. Security in country 
areas in Central Java had deteriorated sharply due to the activities of "bandit" 
groups and village militias operating under the Sultan's o rd e rs .101t His intentions 
appear to have been to impede the British military operations in the region by ren­
dering the roads impassable and, after the outbreak of open hostilities in June 1812, 
by picking off isolated British units in skillfully laid ambushes. Mackenzie, for
102. 10L Mack. Pr. 14 pt. 15, "Report S Journal of Lieutenant Colonel C . Macken­
zie's Proceedings on the Island of Java from 1st October 1811 to 7th June 1813 trans­
mitted to the Commander in Chief at Fort St George— and continuation afterwards to 
18th July 1813. -  Communicated with a Copy of the Former to the Government at 
Fort William of [s/'c] the 14th December 1813," p. 233 n.
103. Dj. B r. 29, Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to G. A . Addison (Batavia/Bogor),
August 18, 1814.
104. See M. L. van Deventer, ed ., De Opkomst van het Nederlandsch in Oost- 
Indie: Verzameling van onuitgegeven Stukken uit het Oud-koloniaal Archief, vol.
13 (The  Hague: Nijhoff, 1888), pp. 547-48 (on the "bandits" who terrorized the 
main roads to Surabaya and Surakarta after Governor-General Jan Willem Janssens' 
[in office, May-September 1811] defeat at Jati Ngaleh by the British on September 
16, 1811, and the plundering of his military HQ at Salatiga by Javanese deserters 
from the armies of the Central Javanese rulers) ;IO L Eur. F 148/17 (Raffles-Minto 
coll., vol. 17), Capt. W. Robison to Lord Minto, September 26, 1811 (on the "ban­
ditti" who infested the road from Surakarta to Yogyakarta and made it dangerous 
for small parties to travel); Dj. B r. 9A, F. G. Valck, "Overzigt der voornaamste 
gebeurtenissen in het Djokjokartasche rijk sedert dezelfs stichting in den jare 1755 
tot aan het einde van den door den opstand van den Pangeran Ario Dhipo-Negoro 
verwekten oorlog in den jaren 1825 tot en met 1830," f. 101 (on the armed robberies 
against Europeans living in Klathen and against the estate of W. Coops near Y o g ya ); 
Dj. B r. 39, P. Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Radfen Adipati Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 
24 Puwasa AJ 1738 (October 12, 1811); and Dj. B r. 24, idem to Capt. W. Robison 
(Batavia), October 14, 1811 (on the attacks on the European quarter in Klathen and 
the security situation in the Yogya area); Valck, "O verzigt," f. 106; De Haan, P ri-  
angan: De Preanger-Regentschappen onder het Nederlandsch Bestuur tot 1811, vol.
1 (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1910), pt. 2, p. 98; and J . Hageman Jc z ., "De Engel- 
schen op Java," TBG  6 (1856) : 414 (on the attack on Pieter Engelhard's party at 
Jambu in Kedhu by "robbers" acting on the orders of Hamengkubuwana II in late 
November 1811, as he journeyed to Semarang).
example, referred in his journal to the "numerous bodies of armed men" that he en­
countered on his journey from Surakarta to Yogya during his first visit to the Sul­
tan's capital in late December 1811,105 and later, a contemporary Javanese source 
described how a party of British dragoons were cut to pieces as they tried to cross 
the Kali Gajahwong at Jenu (near the present-day Ambarrukmo) by kraton infantry­
men and village levies armed with pikes, slings, and sharpened bamboo poles.106 
Furthermore, the tollgates had long been a bone of contention between the Sultan 
and the British, since he had refused to honor the terms of the December 28, 1811 
treaty stipulating that the bandar and pasar in his dominions should be handed over 
to the European governm ent.107 So their burning in June 1812 can perhaps be seen 
as part of the obstructive tactics the Sultan adopted in the face of growing British 
military pressure. This was not the case in mid-1825 when the bandar and land-tax 
posts (e .g . ,  in Kedhu) were singled out for attack almost from the beginning of the 
peasant uprisings in Java as visible objects of economic oppression.108
On the other hand, there are indications that, even prior to the British annexa­
tion of the tollgates in July 1812, they had become an increasingly burdensome fea­
ture of agrarian life in Central Java, particularly in the Yogya core regions (Pajang, 
Mataram, and Kedhu) where they were thickest on the ground. It has been usual 
to lay most of the blame for the rack renting of the tollgates and the attendant so­
cial abuses at the door of successive European governments after 1812, especially 
the financially desperate post-1816 Dutch administration.109 But, if we look at the 
statistics, it is clear that, in Yogyakarta at least, the individuals principally respon­
sible for the rapid extension of the tax-farm system after 1755 were the first Sultan 
and his son (Sultan Hamengkubuwana I I ) .  It is possible that,in much the same way 
as they emulated European military technology and fortification engineering,110 so 
they were inspired by the effective VOC tax-farm system which was in operation on 
the north coast during this period.111 It is known, for example, that almost imme­
105. Mack. Pr. 14 pt. 15, Mackenzie, "Report £ Journal," p. 228.
106. Carey, ed ., British in Java, XVI v . 23-26 and nn. 138-139 of the babad.
107. See Carey, e d .. Archive, 1: 91, n. 1.
108. Carey, ed. and tra n s ., Babad Dipanagara, p. 266, n. 123 (and sources therein 
c ited ).
109. See, for example, P. H. van der Kemp, "De Economische Oorzaken van den 
Oorlog op Java van 1825-30," B K I, 47 (1897): pt. 4, pp. 42-48.
110. M. C . Ricklefs, Jogjakarta under Sultan Mangkubumi 1749-1792. A History of 
the Division of Java (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 282 (for a discus­
sion of the way in which the new fortifications built around the Yogya kraton in 1785 
at the Yogya Crown Prince's (later Hamengkubuwana II) instigation were modeled on 
the architecture of the recently completed Dutch military HQ at Weltevreden). See 
also ib id ., pp. 258, 278; Raffles, History, 1: 296; and W. Thorn, Memoir of the 
Conquest of Java with the subsequent operations of the British Forces in The Orien­
tal Archipelago (London: Egerton, 1815), p. 388 (for references to the use of Euro­
pean manufactured cannon in Y o g ya ); and H. G . Nahuys van Burgst private collec­
tion (Leiden University Library, Bibliotheca Publica Latina 616) [henceforth NvB] 
Port. 3 pt. 1, W. H. van IJsseldijk (Yogyakarta) to A . Schwenke (G resik), Decem­
ber 10, 1792; and idem to idem, January 22, 1793 (on the purchases of cannon and 
ammunition by Hamengkubuwana II from the armaments foundries in Gresik).
111. I am grateful to Professor Ben Anderson for this suggestion. It is likely that 
the first Javanese ruler to emulate VOC tax-farm methods was Amangkurat II ( r .  
1677-1703), who was able to observe the working of the Chinese-run bandar on the
25
diately after the ratification of the Ciyanti Treaty in February 1755, Hamengkubu- 
wana I signed the first tax-farm lease for the tollgates in his dominions (excluding 
the eastern mancanagara) with the Kapitan Cina of Mataram, To In, and by the time 
of his death in 1792 the annual farm payments had been increased threefold to 
46,000 ronde reals (f . 128,800). 112 Sixteen years later, as noted above, the reve­
nue from the tollgates and markets constituted around 40 percent of total royal in­
come.113 14 At the same time, it was reckoned that the main Chinese tollgate leasers 
could make a handsome profit amounting to about a quarter of what the farm was worth 
to the Sultan through private business dealings and the contraction of subfarms.111*
It is easy to see why the tax-farm proved such an attractive option to the fis­
cally pressed Yogya rulers. First, it involved little outlay in money because the 
tollgates were built and maintained by the Chinese leasers.115 Second, it entailed 
no expensive bureaucratic overheads, since the tollgate-keepers paid for themselves, 
and their subordinates out of profits from their leases. Th ird , until the appoint­
ment of the ex-Kapitan Cina, Tan Jin Sing, as a Yogya Bupati in December 1813 
(see below), no Chinese had a political base in Javanese society from which to influ­
ence power rivalries at court. Fourth, in the event of political and economic prob­
lems the Chinese leasers could be made the scapegoat for administrative failures or 
attacked as a way of currying popular fa v o r.116 Finally, the Sultans were even 
spared the trouble of the general supervision of the tax-farm, for this was entrusted 
first to the Kapitan Cina, and then (post-1764) to the Dutch First Resident of Yogya- 
karta, who subfarmed it to a succession of Yogya Kapitan. To save royal face, a 
Yogya official was appointed as the ostensible "Head of the Tollgates" (Wedana Ban­
dar) who acted as the ruler's deputy in all matters concerning the bandar, but the 
real administrative responsibility lay elsewhere.117
north coast at close quarters during his stay in Japara in 1677-78; and there are al­
ready references to Chinese as tollgate keepers and land renters in the early eigh­
teenth century Mataram state, see above n. 35. According to Anderson, an interest­
ing comparison can be made here with the way in which the Thai ruler, Chulalongkorn 
(Rama V) ( r .  1868-1910) copied the customs and excise systems which he had seen 
in operation in Singapore and Batavia during his travels in the 1870s.
112. Dj. B r. 86, M. Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to N . Engelhard (Semarang), January 
19, 1805 (which gives a detailed and interesting account of the history of the tax- 
farm in Yogyakarta from its inception in 1755). See also Mack. Pr. 21, Crawfurd, 
"Sultan's C ountry," p. 133 (who remarked that there were individuals living in 
Yogya in 1811 who could remember the period before the setting up of the tax-farm 
in the Sultan's western dominions in 1755).
113. See above n. 86; and Appendix 3.
114. Mack. Pr. 21, Crawfurd, "Sultan's Country," p. 136.
115. S. B r. 170, Commissioners (Central Java) to G . A . G . Ph. van der Capellen 
(Batavia), October 24, 1824.
116. An interesting example is given in Ricklefs, Mangkubumi, p. 243 of the Yogya 
Crown Prince's (later Hamengkubuwana II) attack on the Chinese-run tollgate at 
Trayem on a branch of the Praga river in a Surakarta-controlled area of southern 
Kedhu in 1778.
117. Dj. B r. 86, M. Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to N . Engelhard (Semarang), January 
19, 1805. The first Dutch Resident to administer the Yogya tax-farms and make a 
profit from them was Jan Lapro (in office, 1764-1773). He also took over the even 
more lucrative royal monopoly of the edible birds' nests from the rocks on the south
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All this stood in very marked contrast to the intractable problems posed by the 
Javanese appanage system, which, for want of accurate and periodically revised 
cadastral lists, the absence of a dependable corps of land-tax surveyors (abdi-  
Dalem priksa dhusun), and the ease whereby newly developed ricefields were con­
cealed from the attentions of royal officials, was hopelessly unable to keep pace with 
inflation and tap the ever-increasing agricultural wealth of the core territories.118 
The lack of an effective fiscal administration in the royal appanage lands thus com­
pelled the Yogya rulers to rely ever more heavily on the tax-farm to meet their grow­
ing revenue demands.119 One commentator has compared it to a "comb" placed on 
the Javanese countryside which caught some of the agricultural surplus as it was 
brought to market, instead of wringing it out from source as a properly administered 
land-tax would have done.120 But it was, at best, a rather wasteful and discrimina­
tory process: while the Chinese tollgate-leasers waxed rich, the toll regulations were 
enforced far more leniently vis -a -vis  Chinese traders than Javanese.121 Furthermore, 
even within Javanese rural society, the burden usually fell heaviest on those least 
able to pay: the landless laborers, poor farmers, petty traders, and bakul. It is 
also clear that the situation in Yogyakarta with regard to the tollgates was very
coast (worth about f. 35,000 p .a . ) ,  and acted as money-lender to the first Sultan, 
see dK 145, Waterloo to Engelhard, February 21, 1808. The Surakarta tax-farms 
were only taken over by the Resident in 1806, see S. B r. 55, B . F . von Liebeherr 
(Surakarta) to N. Engelhard (Semarang), November 1, 1806, who related that the 
administrative costs had proven so heavy that he was only making a clear profit out 
of the birds' nests. For a further discussion of the discrepancies between the toll- 
gate tax-farms in Yogyakarta and Surakarta, see below. On the edible birds' nests 
(fashioned from the saliva of small swifts, Jav. laweit), see Crawfurd, Descriptive 
Dictionary, p. 54 sub: "B irds '-N ests."
118. For a discussion of the Javanese appanage system during this period, see Peter 
Carey, "Waiting for the 'Just King': The Agrarian World of South-Central Java on 
the Eve of the Java War (1825-30)," Modern Asian Studies (forthcoming, 1985).
119. On the increased revenue demands of the Yogya Sultans, especially during the 
first period (1792-1810) of Hamengbuwana ll's reign, see Carey, "Pang§ran Dipana- 
gara and the Making of the Java War," ch. 1, pt. 25. Besides the increased house­
hold costs of the court due to the ever-growing size of the royal family, Hamengku- 
buwana II appears to have embarked on a conscious policy of building up the Yogya 
kraton treasury through harsher tribute demands and monetary fines on his offi­
cials. He was also encouraged in this course of action by his greedy and unscrupu­
lous third wife, Ratu Kencana Wulan, who dominated him during this period and 
used her position to amass a sizeable personal collection of valuables and jewelry.
By 1808, it was reckoned that Hamengkubuwana II had over a million ronde realen
in his treasury, as opposed to the 270,000 ronde realen bequeathed him by his fath­
er, Hamengkubuwana I; see dK 145, M. Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to N. Engelhard 
(Semarang), March 22, 1808. "It is unbelievably difficult to have dealings with 
him," one Resident wrote, "for his quest for glory and desire for money makes 
everything go badly," see Dj. B r. 48, J . G. van den Berg (Yogyakarta) to N. 
Engelhard (Semarang), November 8, 1801.
120. D r. Leonard Blusse, p .c .,  June 1983.
121. S. B r. 170, Report of H. G. Nahuys van Burgst (Resident of Surakarta) on 
the tollgates. May 29, 1830, who mentioned that Chinese merchants were ostensibly 
liable for three times more duty on their merchandise, but in practice they were 
able to get by with only minimal payments because of preferential treatment from 
their countrymen.
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much worse than in Surakarta which, by 1812, had only seventeen major tollgates 
compared to the th irty-four in the Sultan's dominions.122 The more aggressive atti­
tude of the Yogya rulers towards the tollgate leases probably accounts for this, al­
though additional factors such as Surakarta's better endowed appanage regions, 
richer landed income, and livelier commercial contacts should also be considered.
The economic and social consequences of the harsher tollgate administration in 
the Sultanate were apparently already in evidence in some areas by the early nine­
teenth century. In 1804, the Yogya Resident, Matthias Waterloo (in office, 1803-8), 
replying to an urgent enquiry from the Governor of Java's Northeast Coast as to 
why rice prices were so inordinately high in that year, blamed the way in which 
transport costs and local toll dues pushed up food prices in the Yogya area, a re­
gion which was dependent on food imports from Kedhu to feed its population. He 
cited the case of a local trader who transported rice from the important market of 
Pasar Payaman in northern Kedhu for sale in the buitan's capital. This man would pur­
chase a horse load (240 kati = about 148 kg) of hulled, white rice (beras) for f. 6 on the 
Kedhu market, and would sell the same amount for f. 9.60 in Yogyakarta after the costs 
of the market taxes (58 cents), tollgate dues (98 cents), and the hire of a horse 
(f . 1.60) had been met. The trader himself would only retain a profit of 44 cents 
after a grueling 11-hour day, traveling over wretched roads in constant fear of 
bandit attacks. Thus the various tollgate dues, market levies, and transport costs 
added more than 50 percent to the cost of a load of rice over the short distance of 
60 kilometers. It was for this reason, according to Waterloo, that rice imports from 
other productive areas which lay further afield, such as Banyumas, Bagelfen, Rema, 
and Ledhok, were rarely undertaken.123 124 Times of dearth and high commodity prices, 
such as occurred from 1821 to 1825, thus made the Yogya region much more suscep­
tible to agrarian unrest and famine than an area such as Surakarta which could 
better supply itself from its own hinterland or from cheap imports along the Sala 
river, and where the cost of basic foodstuffs was usually substantially low er.12lt
122. See S. B r. 170, p. 127 which gives a list of the Surakarta tollgates and their 
annual revenue returns for 1816-24. The main bandar were: Ampel, Asem, Bagelen, 
Banyumas, Batur, Ganggeng, Jagaraga, Jambon, Kebumen, Kedhiri, Kleca, Pakis, 
Panaraga, Prambanan, Sambi, Sem&n, Wonogiri. For a list of the Yogyakarta ban­
dar, see Appendix 3. Crawfurd (Mack. Pr. 21 Pt. 4, "Sultan's Country," p. 134) 
reckoned that the number of smaller subtollgates (rangkah) brought the Yogya 
figure to seventy or eighty customs' posts in 1811.
123. Archief van Jogja (K ITL V  H 698 a -b , Rouffaer coll.) [henceforth A v J ],  M. 
Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to N. Engelhard (Semarang), December 29, 1804. On the 
rice trade in Kedhu, see also ARA Schneither 92, "Statistieke der Residentie Kadoe" 
(1822) sub: "Rijst"; and Mack. Pr. 21 Pt. 8, Crawfurd, "Report upon the District 
of Kadoe," p. 287, who commented that "the abundance and cheapness of Kedhu rice 
was such that it would bear a journey of one hundred miles and heavy imposts at the 
tollgates without becoming too expensive." In 1832, the province produced 369,000 
amet (1 amet = 200 kati = 123.40 kg) of unhusked rice, of which 23,000 amet were 
exported, see ARA MvK 3054, "Beschrijving en Statistieke rapport der Residentie 
Kadoe" (1836), p. 21.
124. See Carey, ed. and trans., Babad Dipanagara, pp. 42, 70, n. 204. Even 
along the Bengawan Sala, trade seems to have been affected by the number of toll- 
gates established by the rulers along the course of the river by 1796, see ib id ., pp. 
42, 70, n. 201.
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The issue of the tollgates will be considered again shortly, but now it is neces­
sary to turn back again to the British attack on Yogya and the special legacy of 
bitterness against the Chinese which it left in some elite circles in the Sultan's capi­
tal. The extraordinary career of one man played a crucial role here and helped to 
heighten the feelings of suspicion and unease between the two communities. This 
individual was the Kapitan Cina of Yogya, Tan Jin Sing (in office, 1803-13; d. May 
10, 1831) who was directly involved in the internal, political rivalries of the Yogya 
court during the 1811-12 period. A scion of a prominent Hokkien peranakan family 
long settled in Central Java, Tan Jin Sing had succeeded his father first as Kapitan 
Cina of Kedhu (1793-1803), and then as Captain of the Chinese in Yogya in Septem­
ber 1803. 125 European contemporaries described him as "through and through an 
intelligent and skillful man" who combined the "acuteness" of a Chinese with all the 
local knowledge and ingenuity of a Javanese.126 Fluent in Hokkien, Malay, and 
Javanese (krama and ngoko), he had also learned some Dutch and English, with the 
result that he was able to act as a mediator between European officials and the court. 
Like his predecessors, he had been given responsibility for the subfarm of the toll- 
gates in the Sultan's dominions after 1803, although he denied that this brought him 
any special financial advantages beyond the privileged position it gave him for his 
private trading ventures.127
But it was not so much the ubiquitous Kapitan's commercial interests which wor­
ried sections of the Javanese elite as the overtly political role he played in the events 
leading up to the British storming of the kraton on June 19-20, 1812. As a friend, 
translator, and assistant of the Yogya Crown Prince (later Sultan Hamengkubuwana 
III , r . 1812-14), he acted as one of the latter's secret envoys in his negotiations 
with the British ( i .e .,  Crawfurd) which led up to the secret treaty of June 12, 1812 
guaranteeing the Crown Prince's accession.128 During the attack itself, a time when 
most Chinese in Yogya held themselves aloof, if not openly hostile to the court. Tan 
Jin Sing secured rice and other supplies for the British-lndian assault troops.129 
Once the kraton had fallen and the Crown Prince been taken into British custody, 
the loyal Kapitan Cina gave asylum to members of the Crown Prince's bodyguard in 
the Chinese quarter (kampung Cina) just north of the European fo rt .130 In return 
for these services, the newly installed third Sultan, probably under British pres­
sure, appointed Tan Jin Sing as Bupati, with the title of Rad£n Tumenggung Secadi- 
ningrat and an appanage of 1,000 cacah (households), many of them in the erstwhile 
VOC pepper and indigo plantations of Lowanu in eastern Bagelen.131 Shortly after 
this appointment and land grant were confirmed on December 13, 1813, the ex-Kapi- 
tan Cina became a "Muslim" ( i . e. ,  professed the syahadat [Muslim Confession of the 
Faith] and underwent circumcision [diislamake]), cut off his pigtail, and commenced
125. Carey, e d ., British in Java, n. 399 of the babad.
126. NvB Port. 5 pt. 5, Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to H. G. Nahuys van Burgst (Bata­
v ia ), August 9, 1816; and ARA J . C . Baud private collection [henceforth Baud] 306, 
"Rapport van W. H. van IJsseldijk omtrent de vorstenlanden," December 11, 1816.
127. Dj. B r. 86, Tan Jin Sing (Yogyakarta) to M. Waterloo (Yogyakarta), May 1, 
1808.
128. Carey, e d ., British in Java, n. 399 of the babad.
129. Ib id .; it is possible that Tan Jin Sing also helped Mackenzie to assemble local 
artisans for the manufacture of bamboo scaling ladders prior to the British assault, 
see Mack. Pr. 14 pt. 15, Mackenzie, "Report & Journal," pp. 252-53.
130. Carey, e d ., British in Java, n. 126 of the babad.
131. Ib id ., n. 399 of the babad.
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his duties as a special assistant in the office of the Wedana Bandar, Kyai Tumeng- 
gung Reksanegara.132
Unfortunately, matters did not rest there. The rise of a Chinese to a high posi­
tion in the Javanese bureaucracy, although quite common in East Java and on the 
north coast, was without precedent in Yogya and aroused resentment in some quar­
ters. In particular, Pakualam I ( r .  1812-29), a disappointed contender for the 
Yogya throne, became bitterly hostile towards the ex-Kapitan Cina, blaming him for 
the Crown Prince's accession and the loss of his own appanage lands in Kedhu.133 134
In October 1812, for example, there were reports that Pakualam was planning to 
raze the Chinese quarter to the ground and kill Tan Jin S in g .131* Indeed, so real 
were the fears for Tan Jin Sing's life that from late June 1812, after an amok attack 
on his residence instigated by another discontented Yogya prince. Sepoy soldiers 
were stationed on permanent guard there .135
The early demise of his principal court patron, Hamengkubuwana III, on Novem­
ber 3, 1814, left Tan Jin Sing rather exposed, although he continued to function 
successfully as an intermediary between the Residency and the kraton during the 
first months of the fourth Sultan's ( r .  1814-22) minority. A contemporary court 
chronicle even relates that many people in the kraton were still attached (sami asih 
lulut) to him, especially the capable Queen Mother, who recalled how he had helped 
to obtain the throne for her husband in June 1812.136 Nevertheless, he soon began 
to alienate his kraton supporters by his haughty attitude and arrogation of special 
privileges to which he was not entitled under court adat. These included the keep­
ing of a troupe of bedhaya dancers, sitting on a chair with senior court princes at 
kraton receptions, styling his wife (a low-born Javanese) as a "Raden Ayu" (noble­
woman), and insisting on kraton messengers performing the gesture of homage 
(sembah) when they appeared in front of him .137 Conservative kraton critics were 
also incensed that the young Sultan and the royal consorts (Ratu) did him the honor 
of coming to his house in the kampung Cina for the marriage of his son, and that
132. Ib id .; J . Meinsma, "Een Anachronisme," TBG  23 (1876): 132; and P. J . Veth, 
Java, Geographisch, Ethnologisch, Historisch, vol. 2 (2nd rev. ed. J . F. Snelleman 
and J . F. Niermeyer) (Haarlem: Bohn, 1898), p. 307.
133. Tan Jin Sing, who had already served as Kapitan Cina in Kedhu (1793-1803) 
before his appointment as Captain of the Chinese in Yogya, was temporarily appoint­
ed as chief tax-farmer in the province for the British immediately after its annexa­
tion under the terms of the treaty of August 1, 1812 between Raffles and the Yogya 
court. The ex-Kapitan Cina's role aroused Pakualam I's special ire because he had 
hoped that he would be rewarded for his help to the British in 1811-12 by being 
given the whole of Kedhu, a province where his family (esp. his mother Bendara 
Raden Ayu Srenggara) had long held lands. Instead, he was subsequently (post- 
October 1812) deprived of all his appanages there, see Carey, ed., British in Java, nn. 
261, 286, 288, and 292 of the babad.
134. Ib id ., n. 286 of the babad.
135. Ib id ., nn. 126 and 399 of the babad.
136. Ib id ., 60 v . 3. The chronicle in question is Pangeran Panular's (c. 1772-1826) 
version of the Babad Bedhah ing Ngayogyakarta ("Chronicle of the Fall of Yogyakar- 
ta") which has been edited in Carey, e d ., British in Java, on the basis of BL Add. MS. 
12330; see further M. C . Ricklefs and P. Voorhoeve, Indonesian Manuscripts in 
Great Britain. A Catalogue of Manuscripts in Indonesian Languages in British Pub­
lic Collections (London: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 51 sub: "Add. 12330."
137. Carey, e d ., British in Java, n. 399 of the babad.
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senior court officials (e .g .,  Bupati Nayaka) sat on the floor of his kongsi mingling 
with the other Chinese guests.138 Finally, he was accused of harboring designs on 
one of the dead Sultan's unofficial wives, whom he hoped to marry in order to con­
solidate his position in Javanese priyayi society, and was said to have expropriated 
the ricefields of dismissed Yogya officials.139 14023
All these criticisms were symptomatic of a deeper malaise on the part of the kra- 
ton elite about Tan Jin Sing's equivocal position as a Chinese "Tum enggung," feel­
ings which were exacerbated by his extremely close relations with successive Yogya 
Residents,llf0 and his equally intimate association with the newly appointed Yogya 
Patih, Raden Adipati Danureja IV (in office, 1813-47), a man of mixed East Javanese 
and Balinese ancestry, who, like the ex-Kapitan Cina, was also very much an "out­
sider" in Yogya elite circles.11,1 By the time the Dutch Ambassador Extraordinary, 
Wouter Hendrik van IJsseldijk (1755-1817), arrived in Yogyakarta in September 1816 
to take the temperature of the court, he found that Tan Jin Sing had become an in­
creasingly isolated and despised figure. Many of the court Bupati openly declared 
their revulsion at having to mix with him, and the ambassador's old friend, Pakualam 
I, wrote him a bitter letter accusing the ex-Kapitan Cina of being a British stooge, 
and recalling a prediction of the first Sultan to the effect that the appointment of a 
Chinese to a position of influence at the court was a recipe for disharmony and disas­
ter. He thus urged that Tan Jin Sing should be banished from Yogya forthw ith.192 
But later, when Van IJsseldijk tactfully suggested to the ex-Kapitan Cina that he 
should consider moving elsewhere, he replied disconsolately that he was now so 
hated by the Chinese communities in Semarang and Surakarta because of his unique 
political position, that this option was no longer open to him .11*3 Tan Jin Sing's in­
vidious position, suspended uneasily between three worlds (the Chinese, the Euro­
pean, and the Javanese), was pithily summarized in the clever ditty coined by Yogya 
contemporaries at this time: "Cina wurung, Londa durung, Jawa tanggung" ("no
138. Ibid.
139. Ibid. The unofficial wife [garwa ampeyan) in question was Radfen Ayu M urti- 
ningrat, an ex-commander (Wedana) of Hamengkubuwana ll's "Amazon Corps" who 
later became the unofficial wife of Hamengkubuwana IV, see ib id ., n. 309 of the 
babad; and Mandoyokusumo, Serat Raja Putra, pp. 33, 38. The accusations of the 
expropriation of appanages from Mas Tumenggung Mangundipura (dismissed mid- 
1815) and others, is mentioned in AN Ceheim Besluit Commissarissen-Generaal, De­
cember 12, 1816, La A , Kyai Adipati Purwa (ex-Kyai Adipati Danureja III) to W. H. 
van IJsseldijk, 11 Dulkangidah AJ 1743 (October 4, 1816).
140. He enjoyed particularly close relations with Crawfurd and his Dutch successor, 
Huibert Gerard Nahuys van Burgst (in office, 1816-22), acting as a political inform­
ant for them and accompanying Nahuys on his 1818 Commission to Banjermasin, Pon- 
tianak,and the West Coast of Kalimantan, see Baud 306, van IJsseldijk, "Rapport," 
December 11, 1816; NvB Port. 4 p. 5; and Nahuys van Burgst, Herinnerfngen uit 
het Openbare en Bijzondere Leven (1799-1858) van Mr. H. G. Baron Nahuys van 
Burgst ('s-Hertogenbosch: Muller, 1858), pp. 114-17. In recognition for his ser­
vices on the latter mission, Nahuys presented him with a grandfather clock and ala­
baster statues which must have increased still further the cultural incongruity of 
his Yogya residence.
141. See Carey, e d ., British in Java, n. 486 of the babad.
142. AN Geheim Besluit Commissarissen-Generaal, December 12, 1816, La A , Paku­
alam I to W. H. van IJsseldijk, 5 Dulkangidah AJ 1743 (September 30, 1816).
143. Baud 306, van IJsseldijk, "Rapport," December 11, 1816.
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longer a Chinese, not yet a Dutchman, a half-baked Javanese").11*1* At a later per­
iod, a possible way out of this impasse would have been to apply for legal assimila­
tion ( Geliikgestelde) with the European community through a special decree of the 
Governor-General and perhaps also conversion to C hristian ity .11*5 A number of 
wealthy, Dutch-educated Chinese (especially peranakan) and Indonesians took this 
path in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but in the earlier years of 
colonial rule in Java, such a course was not so readily available.
So Tan Jin Sing alias Secadiningrat was forced to live the rest of his days in a 
curious cultural limbo, spurned by his countrymen for his rejection of Chinese adat, 
deeply suspected by most of the elite Javanese as an ambitious upsta rt,14 546 147and self- 
interestedly used by the Europeans who needed his services as a political informant 
but could not offer him the legal security of assimilation into the European commun­
ity. In fact, fate was not kind to this astute political chameleon. By the end of the 
Java War he had been forced to sell most of his lands back to the Sultan in order to 
cover his debts, and he died a broken man in May 1831. His son was allowed to suc­
ceed to the title, but when he himself died in 1857 without leaving a legal heir, the 
remaining lands reverted to the sixth Sultan ( r .  1855-77) by a notarial act of April 
24, 1861. By then the ex-Kapitan Cina's peranakan family had almost entirely assim­
ilated back to the Yogya Chinese community, although they continued to receive a 
monthly annuity of f. 616 from the court until 1908 when they were finally bought 
out by a lump sum from the seventh Sultan (r .  1877-1921). 1‘*7
Although Tan Jin Sing's family swiftly passed from the Yogya political scene 
after the Java War, the ex-Kapitan Cina's own extraordinary career clearly marked 
a watershed in Sino-Javanese relations. His direct involvement in court affairs from 
1811 to 1812 and his personal association with the third Sultan, fueled a growing 
suspicion of the Chinese amongst members of the Javanese elite. The mutually prof­
itable relations between the two communities thus began to be undermined by feelings 
of mistrust, and the seeds of future conflict were sown. Javanese literature of the
144. Meinsma, "Anachronisme," p. 132.
145. For a good discussion of this process in late nineteenth century Java, see 
Claude Guillot, "Un exemple d'assimilation a Java: le photographe Kassian Cephas 
(1844-1912)," Archipel, no. 22 (1981), pp. 55-73. The perils and pitfalls of the 
process (for Indonesians at least) are superbly illustrated in the fine novel by the 
part-Javanese, part-Minangkabau writer, Abdul Muis (1890-1959), Salah Asuhan [A  
Wrong Upbringing] (1928), see A . Teeuw, Modern Indonesian Literature, vol. 1 
(Th e  Hague: Nijhoff, 1979), pp. 62-63.
146. He was, however, quite closely associated with the clique around the Queen 
Mother, Ratu Ibu (post-July 1820, Ratu Ageng; d. 1826), the East Javanese born 
mother of Hamengkubuwana IV, and her political confidants, Danureja IV and Raden 
Tumenggung Major Wiranagara, the commander of Hamengkubuwana IV's bodyguard, 
who, like Danureja, was of Balinese descent from the famous, late seventeenth cen­
tury Balinese adventurer, Untung Surapati (d . 1706), see Carey, ed. and trans., 
Babad Dipanagara, pp. 245, n. 41, 378, n. 178; and J . Hageman Jc z ., Ceschiedenis 
van den Oorlog op Java van 1825 tot 1830 (Batavia: Lange, 1856), pp. 35, 38-39.
Such an association, however, did Tan Jin Sing more harm than good in the eyes of 
most of the Yogya elite because the clique was linked with the aggressive commercial 
(land-lease) policies of the Yogya Resident, Nahuys van Burgst, see Louw, De 
Java-Oorlog , 1: ch. 5.
147. See Carey, e d ., British in Java, n. 399 of the babad. The existence of this 
Yogya court pension was also confirmed to the present writer in an interview with 
D r. Onghokham (December 1978), whose mother was related to the Tan Jin Sing family.
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time reflected this development. Although the author of the contemporary Yogya 
chronicle of the British attack on the Yogya kraton appears to have been quite well 
disposed towards Tan Jin Sing, the chronicle contains an invidious comparison be­
tween the events of June 1812 and the plundering of the kraton of Kartasura exactly 
seventy years earlier, during the prang Cina, when the Javanese court women had 
apparently been violated by the Chinese invaders.x1*8 In another babad, probably 
penned by Pakualam I shortly after 1812, the death of the first Crown Prince of 
Yogyakarta, Raden Mas Entho, the eldest son of Hamengkubuwana I, is ascribed, 
inter alia, to his misdemeanors with Chinese women.11*9 This is the first specific 
reference, as far as is known, to the fatal effects of sexual involvement with the 
Chinese, and interestingly prefigures developments during the Java War (see Intro­
duction above).
Although it is important not to make too much of these literary sources, they do 
nonetheless reinforce the general picture of a serious deterioration in Sino-Javanese 
relations in this period. The increasingly burdensome nature of the tollgates and 
the unique role of the ex-Kapitan Cina thus prepared the way for a major shift in 
popular attitudes towards the Chinese in Yogyakarta. Meanwhile, the significance 
of the Javanese humiliation at the hands of the British in June 1812 had not been 
lost on the local peranakan communities. With their usual political prescience, they 
now began to realize that their interests would be best served by an ever closer 
political and economic identification with the European government. The conse­
quences of all this would shortly become apparent.
5. The European Administration of the Opium Farms and Tollgates,
1812-25, and Its Social and Economic Consequences
Under the terms of the treaties Raffles signed with the courts in the aftermath 
of the successful British military operations against Yogyakarta, all the tollgates 
and markets in the princely territories were taken over by the European government 
and farmed by them directly to the Chinese.148 950 This opened the way for a more ef­
fective exploitation of the tax-farms, a development which was particularly marked 
after August 1816, when the restored Dutch colonial administration, faced with mas­
sive debts and an inadequate income from the land-rent arrangements bequeathed 
by Raffles, sought to use the tollgate returns to cover the shortfall in government 
revenue.151
148. Carey, e d ., British in Java, 9 v . 15 and nn. 78 and 84 of the babad.
149. Ricklefs, Mangkubumi, p. 100. The chronicle in question, a prose babad, a 
version of which is in the Leiden University Library under the catalogue number LOr 
5765, is discussed in M. C . Ricklefs, "On the Authorship of Leiden Cod. O r. 2191, 
Babad Mangkubumi," BKI 127 (1971): 265. It was previously edited and translated 
by C . Poensen, "Mangkubumi. Ngayogyakarta's Eerste Sultan (Naar Aanleiding van 
een Javaansch Handschrift),"  BKI 52 (1901): 223-361.
150. See van Deventer, ed., Nederlandsch Gezag, pp. 322-23 (art. 4 of the treaty be­
tween the British government and Sultan Hamengkubuwana III, August 1, 1812); p. 
328 (art. 4 of the treaty between the British government and Sunan Pakubuwana IV, 
August 1, 1812). In return for these concessions, the Sultan and the Sunan were 
paid an annual gratuity of S p .D . 100,000 and S p .D . 120,000 respectively.
151. On the financial problems experienced by Raffles' government, see John Bas- 
tin. The Native Policies of Sir Stamford Raffles in Java and Sumatra. An Economic 
Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), pp. 17-21; and on Raffles' policy 
on the tollgates, see Clive Day, The Policy and Administration of the Dutch in Java 
(Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 200-201.
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Although the period of British administration in Java (1811-16) did not witness 
a rapid rise in profits from the bandar, it was midwife to another development, the 
rapid extension of the opium retail trade. This was largely due to the greater facil­
ity with which opium was officially imported from Bengal after the lifting of the B rit­
ish naval blockade of Indonesian waters in August 1811 and the financial pressures 
on Raffles' governm ent.152 Once again the Chinese were increasingly prominent as 
opium farmers and retailers in the principalities, becoming the targets of popular 
hatred when economic conditions in south-central Java started to decline sharply 
due to the droughts and harvest failures of the years 1821-25. 153 154
The statistics of official opium sales in the principalities reflect the increase in 
opium consumption in Yogyakarta during these years. Sales doubled between 1802 
and 1814, by which time the wholesale value of a chest of opium (148 avoirdupois 
pounds) had also increased twofold due to the effects of inflation and the more 
stringent British enforcement of the monopoly. 151t During the next decade (1814-24), 
the revenue from the Yogya opium farm multiplied five times, and by 1820 there were 
372 separate places licensed to retail opium in the Sultan's territories, namely nearly 
every major tollgate (bandar), sub-tollgate (rangkah), and market in the Sultan­
ate. 155 The exact number of opium addicts is difficult to ascertain. On the basis 
of consumption figures compiled in the late nineteenth century, a Dutch official con­
cluded that about 16 percent of the Javanese population took opium ,156 but if one 
counts all those who inhaled or digested "poor men's" varieties, such as opium- 
soaked cigarettes, opium-seasoned coffee, and opium-laced betelnut, the incidence 
of narcotic consumption was almost certainly very much h ig h e r.157
For the early nineteenth century, there are various impressionistic accounts. 
Thus a Dutch traveler who visited the principalities in 1812, remarked on the wide­
spread use of opium by the members of the porters' guilds (gladhag) and unem­
ployed laborers in the court towns. He also stressed how the tollgate opium outlets 
spread the habit amongst the country inhabitants.158 As he passed through the 
usually busy market of Klathen one morning, he noticed how full the opium dens 
were and how threadbare their inhabitants: some were barely clothed, others 
dressed in worn-out k a in .159 Certainly an opium habit was an expensive luxury
152. J . J . Hasselman, "Nota omtrent de opium-pacht op Java en Madoera," Hande- 
lingen en Ceschriften van het Indisch Cenootschap, 5 (1858): 18-37.
153. See Carey, "Waiting for the 'Just K in g."'
154. See Appendix 3, n. 6.
155. Dj. B r. 64, "Extract uit de algemeenen staat der amfioen kitten behoorende 
bij de resolutie van den 29 Juli no. 11, aantoonende de plaatsen alwaar in deze 
Residentie [Yogyakarta] door den Amfioen Pachter in het klein zal mogen worden 
verkocht met aanwijzing van het aantal kitten op elke plaats" (1821); and see 
Appendix 3.
156. J .  A . B. Wiselius, De Opium in Nederlandsch- en in Britsch-lndie, econo- 
misch, critisch, historisch (The  Hague: Nijhoff, 1886), p. 6.
157. See Rush, "Opium Farms," p. 20; and Raffles, History, 1: 102-3, who distin­
guished between the crude opium (manta) "eaten" by people in the interior of Java, 
especially in the principalities, and prepared opium (madat/candhu), which was 
smoked extensively along the north coast.
158. K ITL V  H, Van Sevenhoven, "Aanteekeningen," p. 73.
159. Ib id ., pp. 79-80.
Plate 3. An opium den in Java in the early nineteenth century. From E. 
Hardouin and W. L. Ritter, Java. Tooneelen uit het Lever), Karakterschetsen 
en Kleederdragten van Java's Bewoners (The Hague, 1853-55), p. 27. 
Photograph by courtesy of the Koninklijk Instituut voor Ta a l-, Land- en 
Volkenkunde, Leiden.
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for an ordinary man. Even the 1i cents which was enough, on average, to pur­
chase a small wad of opium-soaked tobacco, containing at most 76 milligrams (1/5 
mata) of opium, represented about 15 percent of a porter's daily wage at this time.160 
But for many it provided the only release from a life of unrelieved hardship: in 
Pacitan, for example, a huge slametan (religious feast) would be held to celebrate 
the end of the coffee harvest when crop payments would usually go on "opium eat­
in g ." 161 It was also used widely as a stimulant and as a valued part of the Javanese 
pharmacopoeia for treating a variety of different ailments.162 During the Java War, 
for example, there were reports that many of Dipanagara's troops had "fallen sick" 
for want of the drug, and Chinese peddlers later did a good trade behind the 
prince's lines when the violent sinophobe sentiments of the first months had eased 
slig h tly .163 Several Yogya Pang^ran and high officials also acquired the taste for 
smoking high-grade opium, and princely addicts were noticed amongst Dipanagara's 
followers at Selarong in July 1825. 164
A pastime for the rich, opium addiction was a disaster for the poor. Even the 
slightest predilection for the drug exhausted the scarce savings of a Javanese peas­
ant and made his economic position still more precarious. The road to social degra­
dation and crime was ever present, as Yogya Resident Nahuys van Burgst pointed 
out during the Java War, when he called for the rounding up of the thousands of 
laborers and footloose vagrants who infested the Javanese countryside, "men with 
no ricefields, whose shoulders and smooth hands bear no marks of labor and whose 
eyes, lips, and color betray the habitual use of narcotics."165
The social consequences of opium addiction and the increasingly important part 
played by the Chinese as retailers was closely paralleled by the effects of the rapid 
extension of the tollgates in the principalities after 1816, especially in Yogyakarta. 
Reference has already been made to the more oppressive nature of the tax-farm in 
the Sultanate when compared to the neighboring dominions of the Sunanate and 
Mangkunagaran. In the space of a decade (1811-21) after the European annexation 
of the farm, the number of tollgates in Yogyakarta territories had climbed from th irty -
160. Wiselius, De Opium, p. 6; Rush, "Opium Farms," p. 27; and Crawfurd, De­
scriptive Dictionary, p. 313, who commented that the annual adult consumption of 
opium in Java was only 40 grains as opposed to 330 grains in Singapore, because of 
the low wages on the island. On the 10 cents (8 duits) a day paid to the members 
of the porters' guilds, see K ITLV  H 503, Van Sevenhoven, "Aanteekeningen," pp. 
49-50.
161. R. A . Kern, "Uit Oude Bescheiden (Geschiedenis van de Afdeeling Patjitan in 
de Eerste Helft der 19e Eeuw) met bijlage," Tijdschrift van het Binnenlands Bestuur 
34 (1908): 163.
162. Rush, "Opium Farms," p. 25.
163. P. B. R. Carey, e d ., "Voyage d Djocjocarta": A . A . J. Payen's Journal of his 
Visit to Yogyakarta at the time of the Outbreak of the Java War (1825-30) (Paris: 
Association Archipel, forthcoming), entry of August 23, 1825 and n. 172; for a ref­
erence to Chinese opium peddlers during the Java War, see Louw, De Java-Oorlog,
2: 215.
164. Louw, De Java-Oorlog , 1: 263, 450. The greater predilection for opium at the 
Yogya court when compared to that of Surakarta was summed up in the adage: "The 
Pangeran of Sala like wine and women, whereas those of Yogya prefer opium and 
boys," p .c . , Professor Resink, Jakarta, October 1976.
165. NvB Port. 9 pt. 3, Nahuys van Burgst, "Onlusten op Java," Maastricht 
(1826), n .p . (for an English trans., see NvB Port. 11 pt. 13).
36
four major bandar and about seventy minor ones, to forty-five tollgates-cum-mar- 
kets, 106 subtollgates, and 187 market posts.166 In addition, there were, until 
1824, three principal tobacco warehouses (gedhong tembakau) on the borders be­
tween the interior provinces and the north coast, where tobacco consignments were 
weighed and inspected by Chinese assessors and customs' dues fixed before the pro­
duce (mainly deriving from Kedhu and Bagel§n), was exported to the pasisir.167 In 
the same period the total revenue for the tollgates from the Yogya area alone nearly 
tripled, and this, after the loss of Kedhu (with its bandar) in July 1812, and the 
abolition of tollgates along the Sala river by Raffles' Order in Council of February 
11, 1814.168
Before going on to assess the social and economic impact of these developments, 
it is necessary to turn aside briefly to see how the system of tollgates and subordi­
nate subtollgates actually worked. According to the Dutch Commissioners who in­
vestigated the system in 1824, the original tollgates of the Mataram state had been 
established at the wayside stopping places (pesanggrahan) for travelers on the main 
trade routes. These wayside pavilions, which were situated a day's journey on foot 
from each other, were frequented inter alia by Chinese merchants, some of whom 
bought the right from the local Chinese Captain to levy small tolls from other travel­
ers as payment for looking after their belongings overnight. Gradually, over time, 
a full-fledged tollgate would be established, run by the Chinese, which sometimes 
had developed from the original, wayside stall (warung) serving the overnight stop­
ping place. Then, as the Chinese became more familiar with the surrounding coun­
tryside, and greater pressure was put on them by the Kapitan Cina to pay higher 
rents, smaller posts (rangkah) would be set up on adjacent country lanes. Until 
on the eve of the Java War, in the Commissioners' words, a tollgate of some descrip­
tion could be found "at the entrance of nearly every village and hamlet" in Central 
Ja v a .169
Complex customs areas, demarcating the zones leased by certain Chinese ban­
dar, were established, with observation posts (salaran) on all the roads leading into 
the separate districts. Their purpose was to check to see that travelers had paid 
all the requisite tolls before they passed on to another customs area, the receipts 
for the toll payments being stamped on the hands of the travelers in slow-fading in­
digo dye. Full dues were levied on the main articles of trade at the bandar of each 
customs zone, and these would then be exempt from all but a token payment (Jav. 
"wang peniti"; lit. : "pin money") at adjacent subtollgates. If, however, a load was 
only going a short distance and merely needed to pass through a subordinate toll- 
gate, then only half the toll was charged.170 The rates on all the principal trade 
items171 were determined by the subfarmers in the individual tollgates, in consulta­
166. Mack. Pr. 21 pt. 4, Crawfurd, "Sultan's C ountry ," p. 134; Dj. B r. 64, "Ex­
tract uit de algemeenen staat der amfioen kitten" (1821); and see Appendix 3.
167. A v J , A . H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) t o C .A .G .P h .  van der Capellen (Batavia), 
January 1, 1824; in 1823, the year in which the tobacco warehouses were abolished 
by the Dutch, they were said to have brought in an average annual income of
f. 40-50,000, see Baud 91, P. le Clercq, "Copie Verslag Kadoe" (1823).
168. See Appendix 3, n. 5.
169. S. B r. 170, Commissioners (Central Java) to G . A .G .  Ph. van der Capellen 
(Batavia), October 24, 1824.
170. Ib id .; and S. B r. 170, Report of H. G. Nahuys van Burgst (Resident Sura­
karta) on the tollgates. May 29, 1830.
171. See ibid, which lists some of the main trade goods as follows: (1) internal
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tion with the principal tax-farmer in the area and the local Resident. They were 
based on the status of the tollgate and the general level of prosperity in the dis­
trict: thus a pikul (61.175 kg) of rice which paid a toll of 44 cents at Ampfel, a long- 
established Surakarta tollgate on the Sala-Salatiga road, was only liable for a toll of 
15 cents at the main tollgate of Panaraga in East Java, 8 cents at the bandar of Paci- 
tan on the south coast, and a mere 2 cents at the rangkah of Pager Watu in the Paci- 
tan area. Furthermore, Chinese merchants were ostensibly required to pay three 
times more duty on their merchandise than Javanese traders, and all toll dues were 
to be legibly displayed at the customs po st.172
Th is , in theory, is how the system was supposed to work, but the practice was 
usually very different. It was often the case, for example, that a bandar and an 
adjacent, subordinate rangkah were farmed by two different Chinese leasers who 
would each levy the full dues.173 174 Tariff rates were hardly ever properly displayed 
and, as most of the Javanese peasants and petty traders were illiterate, they would 
not have been able to read them in any case.171* As noted above, the Chinese ban­
dar were always far more lenient with their own countrymen than with the Javanese, 
so the special Chinese rates also remained a dead le tte r.175 The greatest drawback 
for the ordinary Javanese farmer, however, was that there were no fixed duties on 
common foodstuffs and local agricultural products, such as the fruit and vegetables 
grown in his pekarangan (orchard; vegetable garden), items frequently traded at 
country markets. The levies on these goods were left entirely to the discretion of 
the tollgate keepers, who raised a percentage tax (unusan • pelayang), which, in 
effect, meant that they took as much money as possible. Indeed, tollgate keepers 
were often constrained to act harshly in this respect, because they themselves had 
subrented the tollgate from various intermediaries and urgently needed to recoup 
their outlay.176
A Dutch official, who classed the tollgates along with the porters' guilds as the 
two most detrimental institutions in early nineteenth century Javanese agrarian soci­
ety, gave a depressing account of the sort of scene that was all too familiar at toll- 
gates throughout Central Java during this period. He described how a Javanese 
farmer would be kept waiting for hours before his load was inspected, and how the 
Chinese bandar would browbeat him in a robust and threatening way to hand over a 
large percentage payment on his goods for right of passage. The farmer would 
throw himself on the tollgate keeper's mercy, pleading, "Ampun Tuwan [Have Mercy, 
S ir ! ] ,  my family is poor!" But, if he ultimately refused payment, he ran the risk 
of having his entire load confiscated. During the long hours of waiting the farmer
products: rice, raw cotton (kapas), cotton thread, piece goods, tobacco, peanut oil 
{li'sah kacang), indigo, finely woven mats ( klasa pesantrbn), and Javanese paper 
idluw ang); and (2) imports from the north coast and the eastern mancanagara: iron, 
gambir (U . Cambier Roxb., an ingredient used in betelnut chewing), ginger, ben­
zoin, spices, opium, silks, and foreign cloths (Indian textiles).
172. S. B r. 170, Report of Nahuys van Burgst, May 29, 1830; and idem, Ampel, 
Panaraga and Pacitan tollgate rates (1830).
173. A vJ, A . H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to G . A . C . Ph. van der Capellen (Bata­
via ), October 24, 1824.
174. K ITL V  H 395, Chevallier, "Rapport," June 13, 1824.
175. See above n. 121.
176. K ITL V  H 503, Van Sevenhoven, "Aanteekeningen," pp. 70-71; and A v J, Anon. 
[? J . I. Van Sevenhoven (Surakarta)] to A . H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta), May 9,
1824.
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would often be tempted to take opium, which was nearly always retailed at the toll- 
gate, and, in the event of an overnight stay, there would be the added beguilements 
of country dancing girls/prostitutes ( ronggeng) and gambling parties, which would 
further tax the farmer's meager savings. If he had serious ill-luck with cards, he 
would be forced to part with his clothes and the spare cash (d u it ) , which many cul­
tivators and country traders borrowed from their village heads ( lurah) to cover the 
toll dues. In such a situation, it was not uncommon for a farmer to take to a roving 
life rather than face the ignominy of returning empty-handed to his village.177
Indeed, there were few means of redress open to him. Appeals to Javanese offi­
cials about the tollgate keepers' abuse of power were often unavailing because the 
officials themselves had received cash gifts ( douceurs) to ensure that they turned a 
blind eye to extortionate practices. In addition, a journey to the courts to put a 
case before the rulers was usually beyond an average peasant's means.178 The only 
way he could really avenge himself was by enlisting the help of local bandits to plun­
der the tollgate or put it to the torch. Such cases of arson were frequent in the 
years immediately preceding the Java War, and many tollgate keepers met a brutal 
e n d .179 But popular retribution such as this often spelled disaster for the inhabi­
tants of neighboring villages, who, under the terms of the Javanese criminal codes, 
were liable to pay an indemnity amounting to two-thirds of the value of any stolen 
goods or a "blood price" to the family of the murdered man if the crime could not be 
resolved satisfactorily.180 Faced with the constant threat of attack, meanwhile, the 
tollgate keepers began to organize their own "private armies" of Javanese bodyguards 
and thugs, thus adding another twist to the spiral of violence in country areas on 
the eve of the Java W a r.181
The European government was perfectly aware of the harmful local effects of the 
tollgates, and it made some moves to restrict their influence before 1825. As we 
have seen, the British abolished the bandar along the Sala river in 1814, and the 
Dutch followed suit in Kedhu in 1824, a move which led to an immediate increase in 
the number of markets and the level of trade in the province. 182 In the same year.
177. K ITL V  H 503, Van Sevenhoven "Aanteekeningen," pp. 71-77; and see also 
Mack. Pr. 21 pt. 8, Crawfurd, "Report upon the District of Cadoe," p. 281, who re­
marked that "the ignorance and simplicity of the . . . (Javanese) are but ill opposed 
to the known ingenuity of the . . . (Chinese) in the arts of extortion." On the 
opium dens set up at the tollgates and the secretion of the drug in ammunition 
boxes, see above n. 155 and Dj. B r. 37, Raden Adipati Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to 
J . W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta), May 16, 1810.
178. K ITL V  H 503, Van Sevenhoven, "Aanteekeningen," p. 77; A v J , Anon. [? J . I. 
Van Sevenhoven (Surakarta)] to A . H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta), May 9, 1824. A l­
though the Yogya rulers themselves received substantial cash gifts (Ja v. "wang 
bekti" ; lit. : "tribute money") from the tax-farmers, a few corrupt tollgate keepers 
were occasionally brought to trial, see Dj. B r. 36, M. Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to N. 
Engelhard (Semarang), August 10, 1804, reporting the suicide in prison of the Chi­
nese bandar Tan Toen from Mapan (Majakerta).
179. See Carey, "Origins of the Java War," p. 67, n. 1.
180. Soeripto, Ontwfkkelingsgang, pp. 88, 268; and Carey, ed.. Archive, 1: 126-28, 
130, n . 1.
181. Carey, ed. and trans., Babad Dipanagara, pp. X L II-X L III , 243, n. 36.
182. See Appendix 3, n. 5 (for Raffles' abolition of the tollgates along the Sala 
r iv e r ) ; and, on the immediate increase in the number of markets in Kedhu in 1824 
after the abolition of the tollgates the previous December, see ARA Schneither 92,
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the Governor-General appointed a team of Commissioners, headed by the Residents 
of Surakarta and Yogyakarta, to enquire into the working of the tollgates in the 
principalities. The team reported back in October 1824 unequivocally recommending 
the abolition of all the internal customs' posts and suggesting that the government 
should indemnify itself for the lost revenue (estimated at about a million guilders) 
by annexing the western outlying provinces of Banyumas and Bagelen. They also 
urged that all Chinese resident in villages and hamlets should be ordered to move 
to the royal capitals, that every unmarried Chinese who had been in the principali­
ties for less than two years should be expelled forthwith, along with those who were 
unemployed or guilty of extortion, and that no new Chinese immigration should be 
allowed.183 184 Only the "good nature and peacefulness[! ] "  of the Javanese, in their 
opinion, had enabled the oppressions of the tollgate system to continue for so long, 
and they ended with a ghastly prophecy:
We hope they [the Javanese] will not be awoken out of this slumbering state, 
for we reckon it as a certainty that if the tollgates are permitted to continue, 
the time is not far distant when the Javanese will be aroused in a terrible 
fashion.181*
But despite the dire warnings of imminent agrarian unrest from nearly every 
official who studied the problem, the post-1816 Dutch administration felt it could not 
forego the lucrative tollgate revenues from the principalities.185 The threefold rise 
in annual profits from the tollgate farms in Yogya between 1816 and 1823 seems to 
have made the senior colonial administrators in Batavia blind to the fact that the 
bandar were inexorably paralyzing trade in the Sultan's dominions. Writing in 
November 1824, a Chinese tollgate keeper reported his bankruptcy a mere two 
months after taking over the once-profitable bandar of Bantul and Jatinom south of 
Yogya. A prolonged and severe drought since the beginning of the year had appar­
ently destroyed the cotton crop, and basic foodstuffs such as jarak (castor-oil 
plant), soyabeans, and maize were in very short supply. Rice prices were soaring, 
but little trade was being carried on in the local markets because commerce had ef­
fectively collapsed.186
In these terrible months before the outbreak of the Java War, the Javanese 
countryside was a place of suspicion and terror. Armed gangs operated with virtual 
impunity, murders were rife, and the daily activities of local peasants took place un­
der the ever-watchful eyes of the tollgate keepers' spies who were positioned in 
every village and on every country road to prevent the evasion of toll dues.187
P. le Clercq, "Algemeen Verslag der Residentie Kadoe over het jaar 1824," May 30, 
1825. The bandar along the Brantas and Madiun rivers were also abolished in De­
cember 1823, see K ITL V  H 395, "Chevallier, "Rapport," June 13, 1824. On the im­
portance of the river networks in East Java for trade, see Raffles, History, 1 : 196.
183. S. B r. 170, Commissioners (Central Java) to G . A . C . Ph. van der Capellen 
(Batavia), October 24, 1824.
184. Ibid. It should be noted in passing that the Commissioners' remarks about 
the "good-natured and peaceful" Javanese who were liable to run amok if aroused, 
constitute a classical expression of the (self-deluding) Dutch colonial view of the 
"Javaan als de zachste volk ter aarde" (the gentlest people in the world).
185. See Van der Kemp, "De Economische Oorzaken," pp. 42-48 (esp. pp. 44-45).
186. Dj. B r. 59, Can Hiang Sing (Bantul) to A . H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta), Novem­
ber 9, 1824.
187. Carey, ed. and trans., Babad Dipanagara, pp. X L II-X L III .
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Even the dead on their way to burial were liable for imposts, and mere passage 
through a tollgate, even without dutiable goods, would lay the traveler open to what 
the Javanese sarcastically referred to as "bottom tax" (pajak bokong) . 188 Neither 
were high-placed Javanese officials exempt. The gray-haired Surakarta Bupati of 
Nganjuk remarked wryly in an interview with a Dutch official that he was less fear­
ful of the tigers infesting the teak forests on his cross-country journeys to the Su- 
nan's capital, than he was of the bare-faced thugs who manned the tollgates on the 
Nganjuk-Surakarta highw ay.189 Other officials spoke with scarcely concealed bitter­
ness of the obscene way in which their wives and womenfolk were physically searched 
for items of jewelry by Chinese bandar newly arrived from China who were barely 
literate in M alay.190
The increasingly prominent role of the Chinese as land-renters in the principal­
ities between 1816 and 1823 also exacerbated popular feelings against them ,191 not 
so much because of their aggressively commercial mode of agriculture, as because of 
the haughty airs they now adopted in dealing with Javanese farmers and local offi­
cials. Their change in attitude was later alluded to in a report by a Yogya prince 
who fought with Dipanagara :
Amongst the village people who gave assistance to Dipanagara, there were 
those who had nothing to eat, and those whose means of livelihood were crime, 
robbery and theft, who assisted him out of their own evil designs. As for 
those who were not engaged in criminal activities, such as village officials 
[Demang desa] and village tax-collectors [Bekel], (most followed him) because 
of their grievances against the Chinese whose behaviour was very different 
from what it had been previously. They now expected people to make a sem- 
bah of humble greeting to them, and they sat high up [duduk diatas] ( i .e. ,
188. K ITL V  H 395, Chevallier, "Rapport," June 13, 1824.
189. Ibid.
190. Ib id .; the incidents appear to have occurred when the Bupati from the eastern 
outlying provinces were traveling to the royal capitals for the twice yearly Carebeg 
ceremonies at Mulud (to celebrate The Prophet's Birthday) and Puwasa (to celebrate 
the end of the fasting month). Their womenfolk usually carried items of jewelry to 
wear with their official court dress, and also sometimes brought small quantities of 
precious stones to trade, the latter often being secreted in the long female stomach 
band (setagdn) which thus had to be unwound if a physical search was made. The 
convention had always been that the Bupati and their retinues should be given free 
passage on such occasions, see Dj. B r. 48, Piagem of Hamengkubuwana II to Kyai 
Tumenggung Reksanegara, 1 Sawal, AJ 1719 (May 12, 1793); and idem to idem, 1 
Sawal AJ 1723 (March 8, 1799).
191. On the Chinese role as land-renters in the period 1816-23, see Louw, De Java- 
Oorlog, 1: App. 5 and 6. The statistics given by Louw indicate that, out of the 384 
jung of land rented out in Yogya in 1818 to European and Chinese estate owners, 
the Chinese had 167 jung or just under 50 percent. The figures for Surakarta in 
1823 show that the Chinese had 319 jung out of a total rented area of 920 jung or 
about 35 percent. The total leases only covered about 7 percent of the core areas 
around Yogyakarta by 1823, slightly more in Surakarta. Furthermore, the average 
size of Chinese leases was much smaller than those taken by Europeans, and they 
were not so prominent in coffee cultivation, a crop particularly hated by the local 
Javanese peasants since it had to be grown on elevated, "waste" areas, which often 
entailed the conscription of settled villagers from other areas as laborers, see Carey, 
"Waiting for the 'Just K in g.'"
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on chairs), while the Demangs had to sit (cross-legged) on the floor in front 
of them [mesthi duduk s6ba ada dibawa] . 192
During the course of the Java War, the Dutch government did eventually move 
to modify the working of the tollgate system in the principalities, and restrict the 
access of local Chinese residents to country areas. 193 But by then it was too late: 
the war had already engulfed the countryside, and the Chinese, who had been ear­
lier tolerated at the courts as invaluable financial advisers, trading partners, and 
taxation experts, had become objects of particular popular loathing and disgust.
6. Conclusion
Much work of a comparative nature still remains to be done on the local history 
of the Chinese communities in various areas of Java from the influx in the late seven­
teenth century onwards. It is clear, for example, that the society of the pasisir, 
especially Cirebon and Semarang, felt the impact of the newcomers much earlier and 
in a different form from the Central Javanese principalities. Even in the latter terri­
tories, a marked variation in the pattern of Sino-Javanese relations appears to have 
existed between Yogyakarta, Surakarta, and the eastern outlying provinces, where 
the Chinese were less in evidence than in the core regions. In the Yogya Sultanate 
the combination of aggressive tax-farming by the rulers and the unique role played 
by the ex-Kapitan Cina, Tan Jin Sing, in court affairs from 1811-12 onwards created 
particular tensions which were not in evidence at the Surakarta courts. The Euro­
pean administrations' rack renting of the tax-farms, especially after 1816, thus cre­
ated a more divisive and explosive atmosphere than in the neighboring Surakarta 
dominions. Although firm conclusions must await detailed research on the Chinese 
community in Surakarta during these years, the evidence adduced so far helps to 
clarify why Yogya society proved so much more volatile in the 1820s and why the 
xenophobic appeal of Dipanagara's leadership found such a ready response amongst 
the rural inhabitants of the Sultanate.
On a wider level, the Java War and its immediate antecedents clearly marked a 
watershed for both the Chinese and Javanese communities in south-central Java. As 
far as the Javanese were concerned, it is not too sweeping to say that much of their 
subsequent anti-Chinese bitterness and suspicion derived from their experiences 
during these years, when the Chinese became ever more closely linked in their 
minds with the oppressive economic policies of the European government. The sub­
sequent Chinese role as overseers during the period of the cultivation systems con­
firmed this association. At the same time, as a consequence of the events of the 
1810s and '20s, the Chinese themselves became ever more conscious of their exposed 
and vulnerable position in Javanese society. The option of assimilation into the 
Javanese world now appeared much less attractive. Indeed, the special legal privi­
leges accorded them by the Dutch from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, and 
the more rigorous enforcement of the boundaries of the "plural society," tended to 
steer Chinese peranakan towards self-conscious identification with the Chinese
192. Dj. B r. 1911, Anon. (Pangeran Mangkudiningrat I I ) ,  Report on the causes of 
the rebellion in Java, 1826; for further references to Mangkudiningrat's views of 
the Chinese, see ARA Geheim en Kabinets Archief, September 20, 1830 no. 56k 
gehefm, "Verbaal," interview with Mangkudiningrat, April 13, 1830.
193. See NvB Port. 10 pt. 6, Nahuys van Burgst, "Verslag over de Tolpoorten en 
Bazaars (Pasars) in de Vorstenlanden," April 28, 1828, referring to the Besluit of 
Commissioner-General L. P. J . du Bus de Cisignies (in office, 1826-29), dated 
April 13, 1827.
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community in Ja v a .1911 The years of cultural intermingling that had produced "half- 
baked Javanese" in the mold of the egregious Tan Jin Sing/Secadiningrat thus be­
came a thing of the past, not to be emulated again before the era of Indonesian 
national independence in the mid-twentieth century.
194. The Siauw Ciap, "Chinese Assimilation," pp. 78-79.
A P P E N D IX  1
A . The Chinese Population of Java in 18151
Province Total Population Total Chinese Population Percentage
Banten 231,604 628 0.27%
Batavia & Environs 332,015 52,394 15.78
Buitenzorg (Bogor) 76,312 2,633 3.45
Priangan 243,628 180 0.07
Cirebon 216,001 2,343 1.08
Tegal 178,415 2,004 1.12
Pekalongan 115,442 2,046 1.77
Semarang 327,610 1,700 0.51
Kedhu 197,310 1,139 0.57
Grobogan & Jipang 66,522 403 0.60
Japara & Juwana 103,290 2,290 2.21
Rembang 158,530 3,891 2.45
Gresik 115,442 364 0.31
Surabaya 154,512 2,047 1.32
Pasuruan 108,812 1,070 0.98
Prabalingga 104,359 1,430 1.37
Banyuwangi 8,873 319 3.59
Surakarta 972,727 2,435 0.25
Yogyakarta 685,207 2,202 0.32
Bangkalan 95,235 4,395 4.61
Sumenep 123,424 8,528 6.90
Grand Total 4,615,270 94,441 2.04
B. The Chinese Population in Central and East Java in 18151 2
Total Population Total Chinese Population Percentage
Central & East Java 3,731,711 38,606 1.03%
C . The Chinese Adult Male Population
Total Adult Male
of Surakarta and Yogyakarta
Total Chinese Adult Male
CM00o00c
Population Population Percentage
Surakarta 233,409 1,282 0.54%
Yogyakarta 205,147 758 0.36
1. Figures taken from Raffles, History of Java, 1: 62 facing. No. II "Table ex­
hibiting the population of Java and Madura, according to a census taken by the 
British Government in the Year 1815."
2. Figures taken from Raffles, History of Java, 2: 289 ("Population of the T e rr i­
tory of the Susuhunan, 1815") and p. 290 ("Population of the Territory  of the Sul­
tan, 1815"); and ARA Van Alphen-Engelhard 235, Nicolaus Engelhard, "Speculatieve 
Memorie over zaken betreffende het bestuur over Java's N .O . Kust," May 1808.
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Map Showing the Main Areas of Cash Crop Production and the Principal Tollgates, 
Weaving Centers, and Sugar Factories Controlled by the Chinese 
in South-Central Java before the Java War (1825-30)
A P P E N D IX  2
(Map outline taken from Louw, De Java-Oorlog, vol. 2)
A PP E N D IX  3
Revenue Returns from the Tcllgate, Opium, and Other Tax Farms in Yogyakarta, 1808-18251













13,440 6,820 12,540 18,888 19,411 23,040 28,920 33,360 36,120 33,720 41,040 36,120
Gamping 7,840 6,159 6,490 7,331 7,601 21,840 16,800 26,760 18,000 19,080 15,720 13,200
Kadilangu 5,600 6,050 7,546 5,797 6, 112 6,120 7,440 7,860 8,460 5,580 11,100 9,060
Brosot 2,520 1,650 1,364 1,255 1,312 3,600 2,400 1,800 1,380 — 2,520 3,660
Kalasan 3,780 3,300 4,070 5,175 5,344 9,720 7,200 12,000 11,040 11,040 9,960 9,780
Jenu H 560 — — — — — — — — — — —
Wates 8, 120 6,820 6,930 6,708 6,997 10,200 6,780 11,520 10,200 9,240 8,520 11,700
1. The revenuei figures have been taken from Dj.. B r. 86, Tan Jin Sing (Yogyakarta) to M. Waterloo (Yogyakarta), May 1, 1808
(further copy in K ITL V  H 696g, pp. 3-7) ; Dj. Br. 29, R. C . Garnham, "Djocjocarta Toll Farms Sold on the 11th November 1814 for
the Years 1815, 1816 and 1817," November 12, 1814 ; S. B r. 170, "List of Yogya Revenue Returns, 1816-24, " n .d . [ ? 1825] ; and Dj.
Br. 59, "Rendement der gehouden verpachting van ‘s-lands middelen en domeinen sorterende onder het Res. Jogjokarta voor het jaar 
1825." All figures are expressed in Netherlands-lndies guilders ( Indische gulden/Java Rupees) which, at this time, contained 10.91 
grams of fine silver and were each worth 30 stuivers (pennies) of four duiten (farthings). Until 1826, when the Dutch guilder be­
came the standard coin, they were exchanged at the rate of 1:1.25 against guilders minted in Holland (Generaliteits gulden) which 
only contained 9.613 grams of fine silver, see W. M. F. Mansvelt (Re-ed. and continued by P. Creutzberg), Changing Economy in 
Indonesia. A Selection of Statistical Source Material from the Early 19th Century up to 1940. Volume 2: Public Finance 1816-1939 (The 
Hague: Nijhoff, 1976), pp. 12-13.
The returns for 1808 were quoted in silver reals-of-eight (ronde realen) which have been converted to Indische gulden at the 
contemporary rate of 28 dubbeltjes (f .  2.80) to the ronde real, see Dj. B r.  48, Piagem ("Gold" Farm Letter) of Hamengkubuwana II 
to Kyai Tumenggung Reksanegara, 1 Sawal AJ 1725 (March 8, 1799). The figures given for the tollgates include the income at each 
bandar, as well as returns from adjacent pasar, rangkah, and salaran. Figures in parentheses are estimates.
2. The figures for the overall tollgate returns for the first two years after the British annexation of the tollgates in July 1812 are as 
follows: 1812 ( July-December), 46,557; 1813, 99,220, see A v J ,  H. G. Nahuys van Burgst to Commissioners-General, February 4,
1817. The same source gives the overall figure for 1814 as 130,089 (Java Rupees/Indische gulden), but I have followed Garnham, 
see above, n . 1. 34
3. After 1808, only the tollgate at Kemlaka on the main road between Yogya and Magelang in the Sleman area is referred to in the 
lists. The other tollgates listed here were apparently rangkah subordinate to Kemlaka, see further S. B r.  170, "Figuratieve Schets," 
which shows the location of the tollgates on the main roads between Ambarawa, Kartasura, Yogyakarta, and Magelang in c. 1802; and 
Appendix 2 above for the location of Kemlaka.
4. Jenu, a fruit orchard laid out by Hamengkubuwana II on the road between Yogyakarta and Prambanan (close to the present-day 
Ambarrukmo), was presumably abolished as a bandar after the tollgates were taken over by the British in July 1812.
A PP EN D IX  3 (continued)
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1808 1814 1815-16 1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825
K retek 






7,280 3,960 4,444 4, 120 4,306 10,920 7,200 8,640 8,040 8,760 8,400 6,120
Borongan — 2,089 3,190 3,957 4,090 11,520 8,288 9,900 8,820 10,080 9,600 8,412
Serenan 1,848 1,760 3,080 2,884 3,012 3,720 4,500 4,800 4,620 4,080 2,580 1,212
Jatinom 10,920 9,900 11,880 13,608 14,103 25,560 17,520 21,780 19,560 24,000 22,800 18,660
Bayalali
} 9,800
6,380 6,930 9,583 9,872 21,600 18,000 18,120 20,520 21,720 20,400 18,120
Penthongan 616 1,562 1,437 1,502 2,160 1,380 2,160 1,680 — 960 732
Sokawati
Mas a ran 10,080 7,920 8,360 8, 749 9,097 21,600 20,520 22,440 24,120 21,720 21,600 15,500
Pingir
Bagelen
44 671 680 708 768 1,224 2,820 2,040 2,160 360 192
Wongsajiwan | 1 9,120 10,920^Wanarata
Rawa \ 17,600 19,140 18,361 19,159 960 I 5, 280 [ 33,000 31,500 24,600 41,160 31,200 49,321
Jana —  J 20,520J
Rem a





} 4,200 — — — — — — — — — — —
} 17,920Pingit




and tobacco customs warehouses ( gedhong tembakau) subsequently abol-
> ished in 1824 after a Government Decision takeri in December 1823 (see




— — — 18,120 19,320 21,900 21,720 30,360 28,200 31,200
Sibebek J — 10,080 7,680 10,800 8,400 7,260 3,420
5. Referred to as "Randhugoang " in Tan Jin Sing's letter of May 1, 1808, see above ni . l .  It is almost certainly a misspelling of
Randhugunting, a post to the south of the main Kalasan-Prambanan road and just to the west of the Kali Opak. After 1808, only 
Masaran in the Pajang area is mentioned in the revenue lists.
A P P E N D IX  3 (continued)
1808 1814 1815-16 1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825
Eastern Mancanagara 
Madiun & Magetan ^ 7,260 12,980 20,412 20,953 38,880 2 1 , 000 45,600 45,600 51,000 54,660 42,120
Kertasana 1 880 1,166 2,491 2,540 4,860 3,000 6,120 4,860 9,360 6,720 3,612
Rawa ! 26,600 1,100 946 977 1,016 1,560 3,720 4,260 4,800 4,320 3,720 3,012
Kalangbret ^ 1,100 946 958 997 3,000 2,160 1,560 1,620 3,720 3,120 2,412
South Coast 
Pacitan (pasar) _ 655 737 728 759 2,040 1,200 2,280 2,400 1,860 — - -
Yogyakarta 
Yogya (pasar) 11,200 5,676 6,820 12,774 13,058 29,280 24,000 47,120 46,700 44,400 44,520 50,760
Yogya {buffalo 
slaughtering tax) - - — — — — — — — 3,600 3,720 5,640 3,612
Total
(tollgates & markets) 231,148 124,361 147,818 158,159 182,520 362,508 301,944 402,600 406,200 435,240 419,920 393,537
Opium (64,000)6 7 66,000 132,000 8 132,000 114,750 198,480 180,000 237,600 235,200 (250,000) 360,000 (200,000)
GRAND T O T A L (295,148) 190,361 279,818 290,159 297,271 560,988 481,944 655,140 641,400 (685,240) 769,920 (593,537)
6. No specific tollgate returns for the Yogya eastern mancanagara are available for 1808. The figures given here are taken from the 
total tax/tribute returns of the customs farms in the eastern mancanagara which were paid to Hamengkubuwana II in 1808 and which 
amounted to 9, 500 ronde realen, see dK 145, M. Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to N. Engelhard (Semarang), March 22, 1808. It should be 
noted that all tollgates along the Bengawan Sala were abolished by Raffles' Order in Council of February 11, 1814 (see K ITL V  H 696g, 
Archief van Soerakarta, Major J .  M. Johnson [Surakarta] to Raffles [ Batavia/Bogor], February 21, 1814), and those along the Bran- 
tas and Madiun rivers by a Dutch government Order of December 5, 1823. But the moves were not totally successful because at least 
in the case of the Bengawan Sala), the number of smaller tollgates on the approach roads to the river substantially increased after 
the order had come into effect, see K ITL V  H 395, "Rapport van de assistent-resident ( P .F . H . )  Chevallier over de werking der tol- 
poorten," June 13, 1824.
7. No specific figures are available for opium sales in Yogyakarta in 1808, but six years earlier the Yogya Resident, J. C . van den 
Berg, had reckoned that 40 chests of opium were imported annually into the Sultanate, both officially through VOC supplies to the 
Kapitan Cina of Kedhu and Yogya, and unofficially through smuggling operations. The total value of sales amounted to f . 64,000, 
each chest being worth approximately f. 1,400, see Dj. B r.  48, J .  G. van den Berg (Yogyakarta) to N. Engelhard (Semarang), Feb­
ruary 3, 1802. By 1814, consumption had doubled to 80 chests per annum, presumably because of the greater facility of opium im­
ports from Bengal during the period of British rule in Java, see Dj. B r.  29, Lt. A . A. Homer, "List of Receipts and Disbursements 
in Djocjokarta, 1814-15", and J .  Deans (Semarang) to Col. J . Eales (Yogyakarta), June 1, 1814. At the same time, the wholesale 
value of each chest had more than doubled to f. 2,640. The Yogya opium farm itself, which was leased for f. 66,000 in 1814, had in­
creased to f. 95, 370 in 1815-16 according to the revised figures supplied by the Yogya Resident, Captain R. C . Garnham, see Dj.
B r.  29, R. C. Garnham, "Opium Farm Djocjocarta from 1st October 1814 to 31st December 1814," October 1, 1814. The total value of 
annual sales during these years, including the retail profits of the opium farmers and subfarmers, was calculated at f. 211,200, see 
ibid. For further details on the opium trade in Yogyakarta during the early 1800s, see Carey, "Pangeran Dipanagara and the Making 
of the Java W a r,"ch . 1 ,p t .  29; and on the situation in Java later in the century, see Rush, "Opium Farms in Nineteenth Century Java."
8. The figure refers to the receipts from the opium farm in 1816. For the 1815-16 figure, see above n. 7.
